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Th~ succ&ss att~nding Darwin's application of the conc&pt 
of development assur&d the idea an ever-enlarging fi&ld of action. 
The various expressions of human lif• were progr•ssively brought 
within its domain. The inte~lectual disciplines could not escape 
inclusion. Philosophical inquiry was definitely affected. 
a). The category cf chang e became supreme. The conviction 
was born that nowhere can we find content which we lllay character-
ize as absolute. Being is simp.Ly Becoming. Ev e rything is in flow. 
We are in the midst of a great p rocession which never halts. The 
possibility of the stable and a biding is vacated. Relativism is 
the final word. 
b). Everything is to be understood from a single point of 
view. The world- mov&ment is one, A single law binds the most 
diverse manifestations and widely-sundered ~arts. Such unbroken 
unity demands unity of method. The word 'method' received u ndue 
emphasis. In many quarters a methodological obsession resulted. 
The instrumental was given the rank and value of the explanatory. 
The means employed to further scientific investigation were mis-
taken for fundamental principles. 
c). And if demand for universal method were insistept.,what 
would be more natural than the choice of a method already em-
ployed so successfully. The biological became preemin~nt. Self-
preservation is the great impelling force to action and progress. 
Life must be interpreted in terms of instinct. Economy is vital 
11. 
and evaluating. 
has · .~ 
All this/involv~d a deal of misunderstanding and bad logic. 
This has net always be en a r parent. The limitations of the prem-
is~s a nd rang e of the implications have been obscure l y under-
st ood •. The fact outlinas the discussion cf the fo l lowing pag es. 
By way of a concrete inquiry we ho pe to make clear the logic 
of the situation and disclose the proper limits cf certain con-
cepts and points of view. 
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MACH'S PHILOSOPHY I N OUTLINE. 
The interpretation or Mach's philosophy is made difficult 
by his aphoristic style, and by the fact that his opinions are 
scattered throughout his various scientific works. Hence it 
will be of advantage to preface our critical conside~ati cn by a 
sketch of his philosophy as a whole. 
Mach characterizes his philosophical endeavors as "a nti-
metaphysical". All metaphysical speculation is worse than use-
less. The true goal is that of the discovery of a"world-concep t 
which shal l definitely set aside the riddle of the unive~se-­
(a) 
A ccncept whose content is Pure Experience". Mach's world 
throughout 11s a world of elements. In reality there are no 
•things•, as there is no "e~o" standing over against them. 
Strictly taken and properly conceived, there is no subject and 
no ebject; there is no physical a~d no psychical. The entire 
inner and outer universe, rea son, will and reeling included, 
is built up from a small number o! "&leichwertige" elements,in 
more or less permanent union. Custom denominates these elements 
(b) 
sensatiens, but aince this werd carries with it ce~tain pre-
judicial associations, the werd "elements" 
"Colors, tones, p~essures, spaces, times, 
is preferable. 
(c) 
to."J are the final 
and fundamental.Everything else is merely "gedacht",nothing 
more than a symbolisation, the product of certain p~actical and 
economic interests--a purely subjective and relative a f fair-.a 
something possessing mere physiol ogical worth--a "Notbehelf 
a. Avenarius: Der menschliche Weltbegriff. Leipzi8,1891 • 
. b. Al l facts are "contents of consciousness". 
c . P.V. 231. 
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zar vcrlaufigen Orie~tieruni",which, with the advance ~f scien-
tific knowledge, or a change in scientific purpose, must be 
(.) 
given up aa inadequate. 
In this way w~ are to come t~ a proper understanding of 
the EgG. It ia not the original and independent as we so often 
suppose, but rather something constituted. It represent• simply 
a seizure of those elements which are most inextricably bound 
up with pain and pleasure. They are lifted up - into an ideal 
unity most highly economical fer thought. The lar~e signifiQance 
attaching to this unity,arises out of the fact that it stands 
in the service of the will, which is always extremely desirous 
of avoiding pain,and seeking pleasure. We have, thua, a limit-
atit~D which sets iteelf up instinctively, &Bd. becauee of ita 
abiding practical significaace for both the individual and the 
species continually confi~e and strengthen& itself. However, 
we must never lose siiht of the fact1 that, at best, it is rela--. 
~ve, somethi•s permanent only in the sense of being •a group 
of element& more stron~ly coherent, and which more looaely con-
nects itself with other groups ef the same sort, namely, the 
('D) 
e~o of Gther men". The elements aloae are original. They con-
ctitute th• egQ. "To aay that I experience, that is, have a 
sensation of !ree•, is to say that the element green preseuta 
itself in a certain complex cf other elements, namely, impression~ 
memories, etc •• If I cease to p•rceive gree•, if I die, the 
in ~hein accuste~e 
c.. A.D.ll:.lO. 
b. A.D.E. 22. 
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nectiena. To say that, is to say all. That which has ceased tO" 
exist is ~nly an ideal 'denkoekonomische' unity, but no real 
(a) 
unity". It is, thus, absurd to define the ego in terms of the 
absolutely unchangeable, or in terms of real distinction from 
other egos. Such sharp limitations are false to fact, !or the 
constituti5nal elements of every individual are in constant 
alteration. "No soul dwells in the human body, man is not the 
seat of perceptions, but rather, man iB a complex of perceptic:ms; 
for others as well as for himself, he consists of perceptions 
('D) 
alone•. CQntinuity is, after all, the only considerable thing. 
But continuity, again, is only a means whereby conttmt is 
assured to the ego It is this content, and not the ego, which 
is the chi f affair. If we should feel compelled tc ask "who 
has this content, this connection of sensations, who is it that 
experiences,"•• are asking a question of no intellectual sig-
nificance. We are simply falling back into a "less mature and 
mere limited point of view", which regards "every element, that 
is, every sensation, as an unanalyzed complex".And, if we assert 
that a psychical exp•rienoe apart from a well-defined and abid-
ing ~ubject is unthinkable, and fancy that thus we prove the 
essential role of the unity of consciousness,we eud in absurdity, 
!or we could just as well say that a physical event is not 
thinkable,which does not take plaae in any physical environ-




result is the creation of insoluble problems, and commi~al to 
preposterous assert1ons.The eupposee necessity fQr emphasizing 
the unity of consc1Qusnesa disappears,as soon as w~ perceive 
that the a pparent opposition of the real and the exp$rienced 
worldJlies only in the method of consideration. A real cleavage 
does not exist, and so the life of consciousness, with its 
apparently peculiar content, is for the understanding, nothina 
more difficult than the manifold connections of the worlQ. T• 
oQnsider the eiO as only a practical unity formulated and re-
tained in the intitrests of life, resolves our self-created 
(a} 
problems, and gives researeh new freedom and poWitr. 
This conception of the ego, it ia interesting to note, does 
not preclude a certai• kind of immortality. Thouch it is im-
possible to find anything constant and abidin&, the content of 
the ego is AOt confined to the individual, and does not cease 
with death. The "elements" of consciousness of an individual, 
are bound closely together with those of ether individuala. 
Thus, while everyone thinks that he khows only cenoernin& him-
self, and while he regards himself as a separate and independent 
unity, contents of consciousness, more universally significant, 
break through the limitations Qrected, and though bound to the 
individual through whom they have devel~ped, continue independent 
of him, in the form of a more universal, impersonal existence. 
"To contribute towards this is the greatest good fortune that caa 
---
(b) 
come to the a~t1~~ discoveF er,aooial reformer, etc.• 
========= 
a. A.D.F..21. 
b. A.D.E. 20. 
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The ego itself is "unrettbar". This insight, with the fear which 
it frequently inspir8s, is the source of the most widely diverse 
religious and aesthetic perversities. To the simple truth, how-
ever, the eyes cannot be permanently closed. The ego, at best, 
is relative. Even in its highest moments,it, in some measure, 
tails to maintain itself. The belief 1n individual immortality 
will disappear with the comiag of the true light, and a freer 
and fuller view of life will result. Here the ascetic ideal is 
revealed as untenable and false, and place is no longer found 
(a) 
for much that has been detrimental to human advancement. "so 
lona as we strive to retain the conception of personal recol-
lection after death,we are on the same level as the Eskimo,who 
cannot conceive of immortality where there is found no place 
(b) 
tor seals and walrus". 
Ae there are no psychioal subjecta,so there are no physical 
thing•. In content and manner of constitution "Ich" and "Koerper" 
are alike. Colors, tones, spaces, times, etc., conjoin in ma.ni-
f~ld ways, and come into relation with other 818ments such as 
f eelings and willa. From the resulting complex.there comes for-
ward the relatively more permanent and stable. This, impressin~ 
it s wlf upo• the memory, and finding expression in speech, is 
given a special name, is designated as body. 
My table is now more bri&htly, now more dimly lighted. It 
oan be m&de warmer or colder. It may possess an ink staim. A 
toet can break .!!• ~ can --~e repaire~, pol!-shed, part for part 
- - ------ _- = 
a. Cf. Fred. Harrison's exposition of the Positivist doctrine 
of Immortality in his book "The Philosophy of Common Sense". 
b. A.D.E. 20. Footnote. 
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replaced. Yet, for me, i remaiea the table on which I daily 
write. My friend can put on another coat. His face can become 
earnest and bright. Form and complexion do not alwaya remaim 
the same. The a~ of the permanent elemeAt•• however, remains 
so great1 th~t the changing elements aiak into insisnitieance. 
It is the same friene wi~h whom I daily take my walk. My coat 
can possess a spot, a tear. The very expressicn shews that it 
depends en a sum of permanent elementa,to which the new ia 
united,that we are able to make any deduction concer.ains that 
(a) 
which is wantins. It ia the extra weight of the permanent, aa 
oyer against the changing,wbich appeals to the partly instinctive, 
partly arbitrary and conscious economy of representation, and of 
characterisation which expresses itself in customary thought 
and speech. The concept is formed, in the first instance, for 
the purpose of orientation. Then the wil l demands a more exact 
eons idera.tion ef the ohanges which take place in thea• elements 
Tb i-q a "J~ only relatively permanent. The will is thereby moved 
to action. There results & conception of the elements as qual-
ities of the relatively permanent. And these elements have 
place in various and widely-d.iverse complexes. Thus, finally, 
that which is capable of being seen, heard, tasted, etc. separates 
itself from the bodies. That capable of bein& seen resol ves 
itself into QOlors and forma. Froa the manifold of colors there 
cemesforward again, with "elementary force•, a narrower number of 
fundam.entttl charac.teris_tics. In the end, the complexes fall 
. ----
a. A.D.E. 2. 
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apart into elements impossible to analyze. In the course of this 
process,there is a str~ng tendency for tho relatively permanent 
to becvmo somothin& in its own right. Because the elements can 
b ·~ removed one by one without the picture changing in essence, 
or ceasing to represent tho totality, we fancy that all could 
be taken away and still something be lett. Thus aaturally, and 
in a mannor difficult to avoid, there arises the philosophical 
•~nceptiou, impressive at first, but later recognized as no-
. {a) 
thing loss than atroci~us, of a thing in itself. And the sup-
posed philosophical problem of the one and the manifold, arises 
through overl ooking the fact that compact synthesis and care-
ful analysis, are operations which cannot . . be carried on satis-
factorily at one and tho same time, thou~h both are temporarily 
justifiawlo and of exceeding practical value. 
Body is one and unchanging so long as we need not pay attoA-
tion to individual characteristics or elements. For instance, tao 
earth and a billiard ball are alike spheres,so long as we ig-
~oro all variation of tho spherical form, and do not give that 
close attention which critical analysis demands. But wh•"• de-
tailed and cenoreto characteristics assume significance, oth 
(b) 
bodies become more than simple spheres •• 
Now, it is the privilege of man to change his point of 
view at will. He may consider body en masse,or give at t ention 
to the most trivial d~tails. H• may re~ard tho object under con-
a. .A.D.E. 4. 
b. .A..D.E. 5. 
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ment is often diffic~lt. Frequently even the trained thinker 
succumbs, losing himselt in meaningless abstractions. He conceives, 
for instance, of a core of being, a permanent an~ !undWn$ntal 
something, which appears as the suppoater of the transient qual-
ities attached to it. Custom tends to confirm the conception, 
even after kn~wl~dge has dissipated its reality. In addition, 
the large development of mechanical physics, which ascribes tc:> 
the spatial and temporal a higher reality than to the correspond-
in& sensations of tones, colora, eto., sives impulse to the 
tendency to hypostasize abstracti•ns. "The physiolosy ot the 
sens~s mak~s it clear, however, that spaces and times oan be 
(a) 
cal l ed sensations just as well as colors and tones". 
Thus, the bodies do not beget s•nsations. Rather, com-
plexes of elements image forth bodies. Bodies app~ar to the 
physicist as the permanent and real,and the sensations as traa-
sient and passin~ appearance, because he loses sight of the fact 
that bodies are merely intellectual symbols. The fundamental, 
under necessity, ot course, of being submitted to further physio-
logical examination, is the element--the sensation. And here, as 
in the case of the ego, a recognition of this truth wi l l elim-
inate from the realm of physics many a supposedly insoluble 
problem. 
The elements are "gleichwertia"--identical. Whether we 
designate one complex of elements psychical and another physical, 
-----
--
a. A.D.E. 6. 
----
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d~pQnds on th~ point of vi~w. We may express the facts, schem-
atically, as follows: The complexes which we ordinarily desig-
nate as bodies we may symbolise by the letters ABc •...• ,the com-
plex which constitutes the human body by the letters K L M •••• , 
abd the psychical elements, such as ideas, memory pictures, etc., 
by the letters a b c •••• Which elements we shall consider as 
uniting to constitute the empirical ego, depends on certain 
definite circumstances, as, for example the intellectual pur-
pose uppermost at the time. All may be conceived as non-psychical, 
as 'Aussenwelt', or that which stands outside our physical being 
may be so regarded. "Just as soon as we come to recognise that 
the supposed unities,'Ego' and 'Body', are only aids to pre-
liminary orientation, and for particular ends, will •••• the 
opposition between Ego and the World, Appearance and Thing, dis-
appear, and the sole remainins concern will be the connection 
of the e l ements abc •••. ABc •••• K L M ••• , for which this 
op position was only an expression lb.Ore or less correct and com-
plete. This connection is nothing more than the union of those 
(a) 
elements with other similar elements--apace and time". 'Ego' 
and 'Thing' are nothing more than intellectual symbols for a 
complex of sensations of relative stability, and the entire 
world is only a great ecmplex of such elements in connection 
with others in more or less unstawle, loose, and chang ing form. 
"All elements A B c •• • ~K . I.. . M ••• only form a 'zusa.mmeaJaangende 
•a~sht up in every __ •1ement, tall~ •ntirely_ into 
a. A D E. 10-11. Vide also the ~oLlowing: "consciousness is 
no especial(psychical) quality or class of qualities which may 
be discriminated ~ram the physical qualities". (E.u.J. 4l.) 
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movement". "So gibt es also in der Wirklichk~it nur gleich-
artige und gle1chwertige Ele~l'!l~te, Jed9e Obj•kt 1et zugleieh 
ph,-s1sch und psychisch". 
Mach's 'Weltbild1 , as characterised above, gives a certain 
uniqueness to his Theory of Knowledge. A measure of, at least, 
seeming originality and independence belongs to the eaaception 
of Subject and Objeet as merely 'praktisch-biologische' for~ . 
ulations. To know,becomes a maximum and minimum 'Aufgabe'. The 
principle of Economy, recognised as a biological necessity, is 
everywhere the dete~ining and directive foree, Knowing may be 
termed, in the light of the doctrine of elements, an experienoins 
ot elements in themselves. The immediate impression is the for-
mation of a new complex of elements. Such, too, are memory-pic-
tures, and 'Gedanken-Experiemente'. "The stone let loose from 
the hand falls ) not onl y in reality, but also in Gedanken, to 
the earth; the iron mov•s toward the magnet in the 'Vorstellung; 
(b) 
and also warms itself in 1 Phantas1e' at the fire". 
It is by means of such a Monism that Mach seeks to bridge 
the chasm between Being and T~ought, The passage from the most 
sensuous representation offered by vulgar thought,to the most 
abstract scientific thinking,is dir•ct and continuous. The dif-
ference between 'Vorst~llen' and 'Denken 1 is one of degree alone. 
To represent,signffies to know. The laws of association govern 
all experiences. The problem of all thinking, scientific and 
--
a. A.D. . 1 • - --
b. P. V. 249. 
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otherwise, is the ideal completion of a fact fr~m a given part, 
so far as the completion is determined by the case observed. 
"The power which impels to the completion of the half-observed 
facts in thought,is association. This power is greatly strength-
ened th~ough ~ ~etitio~. It thus ap peara to us as a strange 
foro• indep~ndent of our will and individual facts, a force 
which puts both thoughts and facts into motion, and holds both 
( a.) 
in harmony". 
Thus, knowledge consists in the 'completion' of a fact 
through an earlier representation,on the ground of the process 
of association. And, in the higher sphere of the true and the 
false, all is truth and a ll is error,as one wills. In the world 
of elements no real distinction is here possible. The most that 
can be done is to observe the elements in the various stages of 
their coming together, and to discover the laws whereby they 
are formed into a complex. The psychological questio~is the 
only rational question. 
Mach's philosophy is dominated by the spirit of the nat-
ural scientist. His primary interest is Method. This does not 
mean that he styles himself philosopher in the analysis of the 
m~thods of the special sci~nees, but rather that his philosoph-
ical ideal ia, thrGu.ghout, the scientLfic thought of a uniform 
and universal method. This t hought constitutes Mach's phiiosoph-
ical program.!• his own words, his sole desire is "te win a 
a. w'L. 383. 
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• 
otandpoint in physics, which it will not be necessary to abandon 
when one passes over into the terrotory of one of the other 
sciences." Thusf Mach's Monism is Methodological. Everything 
else stands in the service of this conception. An all-embracing 
method moulds our ideas of things at large. How then, we ask, 
does Mach regard science? Whence does science come? What is its 
functi 0n? Its task? 
It is reasonable to assur.ae that science originated in "the 
(a) 
instinctive gathering of experiential facts". Man first made 
experiments, heedlessly and instinctively, in his struggles to 
satisfy his wants, and just aa thoughtlessly and unconsciously 
ap plied them. The development of science was made possible by ih e 
rise of special classes and professions, which made the satis-
faction of definite social wants their lifelong vocation. The 
necessity of imparting experience and knowledge, first occasioned 
distinct reflection. From then on, the real nature, task and 
problem of science, together with the method of all scientific 
procedure, became more and more apparent. 
All natural science has for its goal the adaptation of thoughts 
to facts. The scientific ideal is the copying of facts in ideas. 
Thus science only pursues consciously and of set purpose that 
which takes place in daily life, unnoticed and instinctively • 
Facts never appear as altogether foreign~ Scientific knowledge 
progressively eliminates the new, strange and perplexing. The 
development which takes place here, _"is only a special 
========== 
a. M. Introduction. 
• 
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case of a unive~sal biological procoss ••• The origin of theories 
and hypotheses is not the outcome of an artificial scientific 
method, but reaches back into the very childhood of science 
whore it already appears quite unconsciQus of its own exist-
( a) 
ence". Thought and science, like everything else, .' are the well-
determined result of conjoining elements. "The investigator, 
with his entire thinking, is only a piece of nature like every 
(b.) 
other piece. All elements are equivalent". 
When we ·come upon a fact which stands in strong op r.'osi tion 
to our accustomed way of thinking, and are unable to make an 
immediate adjustment to tho element which requires a new differ-
entiation, a problem arises. But the new fact works as a charm 
which attracts attention to its~lf. Then arises intentional 
thought adaptation, that is, research; for the removal of the 
opposition which has arisen--the new adaptation of thought needed-
io conditioned on practical reasons or intellectual dissatisfaction, 
which alone can beget the will required for the task. 
The goal of acience, then, may be said to be "a picture of 
the worl~1 which, in the largest possible degree, shall be com-
plete, connected, uniform, restins, and capable of no sisnif-
( 0) 
icaRt disturbance because of new entrances". What, thea, we 
ask, is Mach's conception of tho method to be employedT The 
function of science, we are told, is the replacement, or saving, 
of experiences by the reproduction and anticipation of facts 
i• theushts: "With the lea&t possible labor, in the shortest 
-==....;;;;;;:;;;;;---._=:::::::::==::..:;:.. 
a. W'L. 386 and 388. 
b. A.D.E. 253. 
•· W'L. 366. 
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possible time,ev~n with the fewest possible thoughta, to ao-
{ a) 
quire as much as possible of etePnal and absolute truth". 
( \)) 
•science is a maximum and minimum task". The basis of scieRce 
is the economy of thouaht. The fundamental princiJle of thought 
activity is the principle of ~conowy. I• the acquisition of 
kRowled8e it is our aim to spare ourselves a~l the trouble and 
labor possible. We ari to press forward to a "eomprQh~asive, oom-
( c) 
paot, consistent, and faci~e conception of facts"~ by the 
shortest road possible for us to take. "Economy of communication 
and apprehension is of the very essence of science. Her~im, toe, ( di 
we have an unerring guide to the historical origin of scienoe". 
The ~ntire development of the various sciences has been under 
the guidance of this principle. "Within the short space of human 
life, and with man's limited powers o! memory, any stock of 
k~owledge worthy of the nam~ is unattainable except by the grea~ 
est mental economy. Science may be regarded as a minimal prob-
lem, consisting of the completest possible presentment of facts~ 
{e) 
with the least possible expenditure of thought". 
It is to the economy of thGught that we are to lock,for 
the meaning and value of sci~ntific hypotheses and speculations. 
While the task of natural science is one of descri r:.tion, there 
e<lnnes a time when the formal is essential tc the performance 
of this functlcn. Thus, the develQped statements of natural 
science are ~implifications as wall as descriptions. In order 







amount of effort, tabulations and symbols are necessar~. The lwm 
of nat 1~• are nothing more than such tabulated descriptions. 
nin natu~e the~e is no law of retraction, only different cases 
of retraction. The law of ref~actien is a concise, compendious 
rule devised by us for the mental reconstruction of a fact, and 
only for its reconstruction in part, that is on its geomet~ical 
(a) 
side". Theories are only connections in which we place, in 
an orderly maune~, such tabulations. 11 Th~ atomic theory plays a 
part in physics similar to that of certain auxiliary concepts 
in mathematics; it is a mathematical model for facilitating the 
(b) 
mental reproduction of facts". The justification and value 
of all intellectual formulations lie in their powe r to familiar-
ize facts. Whan they cease to perform this function, or to per-
form it with increasing difficulty, they must be discarded for 
more adaquate and effieient :tcrmulations. It is a mistake, how---
eve~, to imagin~ that our formulations eve~ tell us more than 
the knowledge of cur primitive experiences, i! rightly observed, 
would already say. 
The idea of Causal ity, together with the problems of which 
it has been the source and center, is resolved, li k e its fellows, 
in the melting-pot cf cur economic needs. Since explanation is 
not within the range of science, causal connection, even should 
it exist, would not enable us to look intc the reason fer any 
particular concatenation. But scientific investigation shows 
that t~~ is_ ~- ~uch t~iag as causal connection. It was a con-
a. Mech. Eng. Tr. 486. 





ceptio~ forced upon m~n in the early stages of scientific dev$l-
opment. It arose out of the need of supporting weaker thoughts 
by stronger. It had its p~ace, no doubt, but to-day is only a 
hindrance, fromwhich natural science·. has . made itsfilf·, ,, f9r :·the 
most part, free. The real goal of scientific endeavor is the 
exhibition of functional connections. These do not posit on• 
fact as the cause of aaother, but permit only the calculation 
of one faet from another. This is a relation convertibl e through-
out. To quote Mach's own words: ~The idea of cause and effect 
originally sprang from an endeavor to reproduce facts in thought•· 
At first the connection of A and B, of C and D, of E and F, and 
so on, is regarded as familiar. But after a greater range of 
experience is acquired, and a connection betwef:ln M and N is ob-
served, it often turns out th~t we ree,ognise M as made up of 
A, c, E, and N of B, D, and F, the connectien of which was be-
fore a familiar fact, and accordingly possesses with us a higher 
authority •.•• The n~w experience is illuminated by the mass of the 
old experience. As a fact, then, there doei exist in the mind an 
'idea' under which fresh experifllnces are subsumed, but that 
'idea itself has been developed from experience. The notion of 
the necessity of the causal · connection,is probably created by 
our voluntary movements in the world, and by th~ chanees which 
these indirectly produce. Much of th~ authority of the ideas of 
cause and effect.is due to the fact that they are deve~oped in-
stinctiv•ly and involuntari~y, and that they are distinctly sen~-
,7 
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ible of having contributed nothing to their own formation •.• 
Cause and effect are things o! thought, having an economical 
(a) 
office". 
As with the concept of cause, eo with the concept of sub-
stance. Anyone who follows purely practical purp cses receives 
essential support from the thousht of the ego. The conception, 
in this respect, has a certain p~nent value. If we lose sight 
of its true purpose and nature, however, it becomes the source 
of difficulties and contradictions which can be removed only 
when we regard all as elements of t h e world. The philosophical 
hope c! explaining the world of experience cut of concepts of 
substance,by means of causal connections between things 1 is a 
chimera. The prvblem resolves itself with the recognition that 
there is no need of any such explanation, as there are no terms 
whwreby to expl.ail.t. The supposed terma are not realities, but de-
velopments in the interests of life and its activities. There 
attaches to them a certain subjective necessity, and a certain 
practical value, but no objective existence. "The principle of c 
continuity, the use of which everywhere pe rvades oodern inquiry, 
simply prescribes a mode of conception which conduces, in the 
(b) 
highest degree, to the economy of thought". 
Science itself cannot escape resolution. It is merely in-
strumental to the ma ste ry of facts. The concept of development 
rules here as elsewhere. The entire content . of science is econ-
omic. The business of all its formulations is to put us into 
a. Mech. 484-5. 
b. ~Mecb • . 490. 
• 
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efficient working relationship with cur environment. To under-
ntand this purpose1 is to understand all that is to b6 known con-
cerning its existence. The highest terms employed have only tran-
sient value. The final gcal is always biological. All mediate 
goals must be regarded as unneces sary detours. The preservation 
of life is ultimate. "What man has beyond the animal, cultivated 
man beyond the uncultivated, is only the length of the detour to 
the same goal, the ability to discover it ~s a detour, and to 
(a) 
annihilate it". Thus, "every scientific interest we may char-
acterise as an ultimate biological int~rest moving toward its 
(b) 
goal at the pace of the particular detour concerned". 
The hunger for knowledge is recognised as normal. It must 
be regarded as contributing, at least mediately, to the preser-
vation of life. A scmething "independently developed", it makes 
itself tel t psychically as pain.J.f 1 t cannot set J. "LS~.Lr 1:.0 -.,-,orK. 
Tn~;: J.DVt:~:> u..Lga~..ur· ..L~:> a. man W..L ~.onJ.rl wnum ~.on~ desire fer knowledge 
storms as one ot nature's own elementary forces. Thus, he nat-
urally "strains after its removal", and "aeeks a resolving 
( 0) 
thought as the technologist seeks a resolvini construction". 
Every disturbance of intellectual equilibrium is an impulsion 
upward to · restoration in a higher synthesis, so that life 
moves forward continuousl~ out of its ruins to a new fruitage. 
It is true that we meet in Mach's exposition of science and 
scientific method,trac•s of a point of view which lifts the en-
tire discussion to a higher level, and rescues the endeavcrs ~f 
a. E. u.J. 58. 
b. E.u.J. 443. 
c. W'L. 452. 
• 
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~ the investigator from the merely relative and t~mporal. Though 
an examination of these belon ore properly to the critical 
part o! our th~me, w~ may anticipate far enough to make mention 
of the follgwing words~aa characteristic of the larger and freer 
point of view. "Scientific thinking frequently distinguishes 
itself' !rom vulgar thinkin& iu a very signii'icant manner. The 
latter, at l9ast in its beginnings, serves practical purposes, 
in the i'irst place the satiafactlon of' b cdily needs. The more 
vigorous term of scientific thinking creates for itself' its own 
goal, endeavors to satisfy itself, and remove every intellectual 
unrest. In the service of practical purposes it has grown to 
(a) 
be ita own lQrd". Again we read: "There arises the problem 
of discerning, in the large manifold, those elements present 
(b) 
which are constant and abiding". 
Mach evidently feels k venly enough that science is not to 
be grasped by way of its origin, but by way of the goal which 
it freely sets itself, and in the light of the problems which 
it feels 1ta•lt called upon to solve. In ahort, side by side 
with Mach's 'pragmatic' and 'relative' conception of science 
there lies another which recognises the autonomy of. reason. And 
this second conception carries implications which bring Mach's 
philosophy into wide-spread conflict with itself, and which it 
will be a part of our critical task to examine. 
The philosophy, which we have here described, has been 
a. E,u.J. 2. 
b. Mech. Introd. 
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officially catalogued as Sensualistic Monism. As a matter of 
f4ct we are offered, so far as the results are concerned, no-
thing distinctly ~ew,in spite of the so-called 'original' com-
' bination cf elements which those r~sults present. We have a 
way o! thinking which places MaDh in the direct succession Gf 
Hum•, Condillac, Comte, and all those of the Positivistic school~. 
And Phenomenalism, with 1t.s Re.Lat.lvl.st.lc and So.Ll.pSlSiil.C : 1m ... 
p.Ll.cat.lons, 1s a t.ype of philosophy with which we are quite fam-
iliar. In the following pages, recognising that some things 
must be left Unsaid, it will not be our primary purpose to in-
quire formaily into the accuracy or finality of such a point of 
view. It sometimes happesa that a way of thinking is its own 
best critic. Logical inconsistency very often springs, not sc 
much from the inability to think straight, as from the presence 
of a native dialectic which forces the point of view beyond 
itself; not so much from an incapacity te use facts rightly, as 
from the' insistency o:t fagts which, ignored, demand a hearing 
in spit~ -~~ t.~tt t.tutvr)' oc,nc•z•ae•• Th••• ko, & Jhilo.ophy may 
cr&ate problems which prove more .troublesome than t.hoa' : · · 
which it professes to .. solve. Frequently, toe, principles , · 
r~garded as superfluous and false,are unconsciously e~ployed 
as a basis for argument; or a problem, the tr.ue nature of which 
remains unrealised, assumes control. Thus in the followin g pages 
we shall come to see that Mach's conceptions transcend them-
selves, and come into conflict with themselves everywhere, and 
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that, throughout, he is dominated by an historic treatment of t~ 
problem of knowledge· which he persistently ignores and en-
deavors, if not to eliminate, at least to minimise. It will be-
come progres sively .. apparent that we are discussing a philosophy 
which, while posse ,,sing a relative truth, has continued to 
thrive, in these latter times, only because cf the fact that it 
has not come to the knowledge that it ~ is dead; a philosophy, 
too, which lays a foundation fer itself by means of those very 
principles which i t ··. treata as irrelevant and antiquated. In th:J 
present instance particular point is given to our inquiry beca~e 
of the fact that Mach, almost alone of modern scientists, con-
ceives his positivisti~ results to be necessitated by ~ the de-
ve.Lopments of exact reaearQh.The march of natural science,ac-
cording to him, has long been in the direction of Positivism, 
and it is only the 'Ruckstaendigkeit' of the philosophers which 
has prevented them from acknowl edging this. This leads us to 
lay special emphasis on Mach's conception of science and his 
'economic' treatment of thought, and on the fact that there 
does not lia;:. ll direct and unbroken way, i ogically speaking, be-
tween such conception and treatment and the 'neces sitated' 
ph ilosophic results; that, j ·1st as these results depend for 
their establishment on the surreptitious introduction o.f t hat 
which they hold in contempt, so, here , there is an ignoring of 
patent facts, a superficial and inaccurate treatment of a fun-





Complete philosophic endeavo~ has a two-fold function. On 
the one hand, it is giv~n the task of ar~~&tm~nt; it ia oall~d 
u~on te lay hold on those errors and arti!icialities which have 
crept in upon right thinkin~, o~ from which thinking in general 
has never been delivered. It is an intellectual health-officer 
whose duty it is to take into custody intell~ctual vagrants, 
to expose them in their true character, to so pillory them 
be!ore the public gaze that it will be impQssible for' them ,, 
again to deceive and destroy. Such a task is extremely import-
ant, and by no means easy. And wherever thinking p3rforms this 
function, however inadequate or inaccurate may be its positive 
endeavors, it does r~al service,and possesses real valu~. 
Critical analysis must always bear this in mind in order to be 
sympathetic and just. Mach's 'Elementenlehre' must be consid-
erect -.-i tL the : licht of the criticism offered,of the habit of 
thought found in v ogue. 
"I have end~avored", he t~lls us, "to remove an old and 
. (a) 
stale philosophy from physical science". This "old and 
stale philosophy" is one quite familiar. It had dominated 
philosophy up to the time of Kant, and, in his critical work, 
is not altogether exorcised. Since Kant's time it has reappear-
ed in a variety of forms and connec t ions. Irt the present in-
staace we !ind mechanical science in bon~age to it, and unde.r 
its control becoming decidedly ir rational. Mental fictions 
are mistaken for actual existences;barren abstracti~ns made 
a. E.u.J. Verwort. 
•• 
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ths exact transcript of concrete ~ eal ity; quantitative formulations 
~iven a l l the value of explanatory principles. The means employed 
to facilitate scientific inquiry became a n end; the ideal, 
which gave inspiring power to investigation, replaced the living 
fact found by way of continued and careful analysis. So runs the 
sto~y of the naturalistic obsession with al l its at t endant woes. 
No one has better portrayed its true character than Ward,in his 
bo ok 'Naturalism and Agnosticism'. We rQad there of "a science 
which, at the cutset, is simpl~ formal and quantitative~ seeming-
ly, in the end, yielding "the ideal of concrete physical existenc~3 
what Kant might have called the Omnitudo Realitatis of the 
physical world, and this becomes, for those to whom the physical 
wor~d is primary and fundamental, the supreme and only Omnitudo 
(a) 
Real itatis that scienee ~an ever know". But, in its advanue, 
this science overreached itself. Its true character became 1n-
creasingly apparent, its objects were seen more and more plainly 
as mere fict i ons of the undii~standing instead of conceivably 
presentabl& facts, and its descript i ve .:.analogies as mer&ly the 
inevitable outcome of an endeavor to summarise phenom&na in terms 
of motion. Finally, the seemingly advancing tide of matter be-
gan to weigh 8 l1ke a nightmare on the best minds" of the time, 
and he who could reveal the true logic of the situation_,was in 
the way of performing a true service to his fellow th1nk•rs. 
This, Mach, in some measur&, did, and this Degative service we 
cannot afford to lose sight of. It was no sma l l matter to re-
a. Natural ism etc. vol.l. p.l43. 
• 
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veal a good part of mechanics as I!lerely a device for calculation, 
as nothing more than a mlians for dealing with facts, as ~;purely ·.:. 
relative and methodical procedure • 
-2-
We consider the 'Elementenlehre' first as Phenomena~ism. 
Knowledge contains no metaphysical implication. The Absolute is 
milani ngless and non-existent. Appearance is the only t.c>ue reality. 
The subject itself is no final unifying principle, but merely a 
modification of phenomenal being, of practical necessity for our 
daily commerce with the so-eal.l~;;d objective order. The 'elements' 
are transcendent,in that they have independent objective exist-
ence, but, in so far as they arli capable of being known in their 
!ul l reality, they must become the content of an empirical per-
sonal consciousness. They are L :manent.,_in that they mast belong 
to an ego in order to b e known; transcendent, however, in that 
they exist without being linked to any such ego complex. In the 
final analysis, the opposition between transcendent and immanent 
r eali ty, disappears. 
Is this doctrine as free from all metaphysical content as 
it claims, and seems to be, or will a c loser scrutiny reveal pre-
suppositions which carry it beyond itself? This is the present 
question. our interest in the matter is somewhat sharpened by 
the fact that, histo rically, Phenomenalism has found it impossible 
to remain tru~ t o its own assertions. Inevitably its exponents 




cries, concernibg all conceptual thinking •tnto the fire with it", 
and, then, on~y by a ~rick of language, hides his metaphysical 
presuppositions fr~m himself. He lays special weight on the peint 
that the metaphysical cannot be substantiated either by ex-
periince c.r by logical thought, that it rests upon and is depived 
from a fictitious substitution of impressions derived frQro re-
flect.Lon for those of sensation, and yet transcends his point of 
view with the very assertion itself. He looks without and within, 
and finds nothing anywhere but activities and qualities of a 
purely phenomenal order, but the fol l owing quotation shows how 
impossiale it is for him to remain on t h is level. "For my part", 
he says, "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, 
I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of 
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. 
I never catch myself, at any tirue, without a perception, and never 
can observe anything but the perception •.• If anyone, upon serious 
and unprejudiced reflection, thinka he has a diffepent idaa of 
himself, I must confess I can no longer reason with him. All I 
can a~low him is that he may be in the right as well as I,and 
that vre are essentially different in this particu~ar. He may, 
perhaps, percwive aomething simple and continued which he calla 
(a) 
himself, though I am ~ertain there is no stach princi~le in me" • 
We have simply to substitute for the personal pronouns ia the 
above quotation the vanishing impressions fer which he is so 
desirous of standing sponsor, and we see at once how the very 
a. Treatise on Human Nature, Part lV., Sect . V1. 
-26-
assertion itself depends on a transcendence of the position here 
taken. If the vanishing impressionsare all,there r•mains neither 
a knower)nor anything known. 
Comte does not fare any better than Hume. His 'general 
!acts', by an unavoidable dialectic, pass over into a conceptual 
existence. His limitation of knowledge to physical phenomena and 
their laws , becomes decidedly metaphysical before t.he 'describ-
tha.t 
ing' process is completed. "When positivism says more than/the 
phenomena called mental are so and so related to the phenomena 
called material--when it says(as it does with Comte) that the 
fGrmer can be referred to or resolved intc t~e latter, so as to 
be really material phenomena;--it supposes to be true what it 
professes to deny--viz., the reality of causes and substances; it 
supposes that matter is not an aggregate of phenomena, but a 
(a) 
substance o.r cause, or both". Worse than this, Comte falls all 
the way back into the depths of theological 'fictions' and 'super-
stitions' in his worahip of the Grand Etre which, in the final 
analysis, becomes a mere abstract ideal. 
The materialistic positivism cf Comte is forced, by its 
nature, to abdicate in favor of the idealistic positivism cf 
Mill. All our knowledge confines itself to mental phenomena. The 
whole universe is merely a series of states of consciousness. Th' 
implication is Sce~ticism. Mill tries to save the situation by 
his doctrine of a "permansnt possibility of sensations". As to 
whether this saves the s.ttuation is not cur present concern. 
a. Flint: Anti-Theistic Theories; Blackwood and Sons,l894. 
p.l84. 
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The thing to be ncted,is that such a 'possibility' is not a 
phenomenon, for if we know only what is phenomenal 3 we cannot 
knew what is distinct from and explanatory cf the phenomenal. 
Spencer, lik~ Mill, falle into the very way of thinking 
from which he desires to deliver> humanity. The wor>ship of an Un-
knowable which is the "necessa~y implicate of all consciousnes s ", 
and the doctrine of a "superper>s onal " reality with a decided 
content, have very little in common with either Agnosticism or 
Positivism. Final ly, Fred. Harrison spends much labor t o prove 
that the metaphysical is not native to the mind of man, is tn 
fact, merely an excrescence of philosophy, and, in the end, 
makes his 'human synthesis' an impos s ibility unless referred to 
a somewhat which trans'cends the merely relative and individual. 
Does Mach fare any better, or are we face to face with a syst~m 
of thought which, if set fcrth , in speech, hopelessly centra-
diets itself in the interests of metaphysical inquiry? 
Mach character>izes his elements as "letzte Rea. l itaeten". 
He says: "We must not desire to explain the seasation. I .t is 
something so simple and fundamental that to carr>y it back to 
. (a) 
anything simpler is, at least : fer the present, an impossibility." 
The sensations are the original facts of the psychical life~as 
they are of the world at large. What does this doctrine of last 
elements involve? A number of questions arisesso soon as we 
attempt t c give some account <Df their nature. We find it in-
creasingl y difficult to avoid metaphysical implicati ons. Hew, 




for example, do we come to know anything about final, simple 
sensations? Nona of them remains for a single moment constant. 
Is the actual sensation, then, composed of elements which are 
b~yond observation, whose ~xistance and pNtsance ar~ asserted ::.: ... 
simply because scientific aualysis so raquir~s? But, if so, can 
the elements be distinguished in principle from th~ concepts to 
which physical analysis has led? Or are thea• elementat'y sensatioas 
poss•ss•d of self-activity,and in process of change? Then our 
problem is merely postponed, for we are led to ask,What is the 
signififance of change,if the idea does not carry with it the 
corresponding idea of a something which remains equal with it-
self, and, uniting with other constants, simply forma a new 
grouping? Thus, we are invelved in the paradox that eith~r the 
elements are simple and incapable of being obse~ved, or they are 
in a state of change and so cannot any longer be simple. The 
nature of the difficulty points to its own solation. If, in 
reality, the sensations as 'last elements' of the psychical life, 
are to have any real value, they must be defined in the same 
way as the 'last things' of the physicist. namely, as something 
absolutely simple and incapable of representation in intuition. 
In other words, the 'last elements' are products of abstraction 
and nothing more. He who considers them as real subscribes to a 
metaphysics, and gives to a conc~ption, adapted to a certain 
narrowly defined purpose, the valus of a principle fundamental 
to all investigation. 
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Mach, at a late period in his thinking, seems to have becoae 
aware of the abstract natare of these fixed elements .He says: 
"The analysis in the div 14i.on which I am pleased to characterise 
as 'E~ements' is scarcely thinkable from the naive point of view ) 
of primitive man •••• In its entirety it is the product of scien-
tific experiences and refleotions ••• But one thing is tc be notio~4 
While no difficulty is inv,lved in building up every physical 
event out of sensations, thus out of psychical elements, there 
is no possi.ility ot learning how, out of the elements employed 
in present day physics, that is out of masses and motions, any 
(a) 
kind of psychical occurrence can be exhibited". 
Another remark which Mach makes , expresses a recognt tion of 
the real natur• of his 'elementary sensations'. He says: "We :can . 
a·ay ,. ~i th · perfect · -!-rut~, that the simple sensations are abstract-
ions, but need not necessarily assert that there lies at their 
(b) 
root no actual occurrence". These words are significant,for 
their consistent a pr;lioation would necessitate a thorough re-
vision of Mach's main points of view. 
Thus, Mach's doctrine, on its positive side, does not turn 
ou.t very hap pily for himself. He is keenly conscious of the in-
adequacies of the physical metaphysics; the conception of qual-
i ties inhfiring in a 8Enhe~hina :. im~ossible of apprehension ia 
ranked a.e 'Fetichism; the 'Thing' is made symbolic; yet Maoh does 
net escape t h& same way of thinkin~, for his 'qualitative elements~ 
as we have found, are nothing more than abstractions. In this 




respect, Mach follows the course of all phenomenalistic doctrine. 
"Phenomenalism and the extreme of individual idealism are for-
ever, professedly, fighting 8hy of abstractions. They exhibit an 
anxiety, usually earnest but o!ten excessive, to get at the co~ . 
crQte facts and to tell a plain, unvarnished tale about them. 
Hence the customary amount of polemic in the treatises on men-
tal life produced by them, and whioh is directed against hypost-
aaisins the results of tha thinking faculty. But what, taken 
at its lit~ral worth, is this conclusion which they themselves 
suppoetT It is an hypostasis of the abstract and purely imag-
inary statical condition of a being, which is made to take the. 
. (a) 
p&ace o! the living and acting reality". Nor is this lapse 
a mere chance or temporary rasult. It results from the blind,~f 
not wilful, ignoring of facts which must, in the end, be ad-
mitted. Phenomenalism, in its emphasis on faits, overreaches 
itself, for the moment in which it takes account of all the fa~s~ 
it meets an objec ion fatal to its own existence. Even ilJ.usory 
ways of thinking are, as faets, quite undeniable. And phenomen-
alism is asked to explain bow, on its principles, their exist-
ence is possible. Granting only elements and their laws, no 
unity is a possibility,and Phenomenalism itself, acknowledging 
the logic of the situation, must cease to be. Do we not here 
stumble upon the problem to which all phenomenalistic thinking 
must succumb, namely, the problem of the One and the Many,or,in 
other words, the problem of Identity and Change? It was the felt 




need of finding unity,and at the same time providing for change, 
which led Mach into ultimate hypostasizations. Elements and re-
lations are distinct. They cannot be resolved into one another. 
Yet to have meaning they must belong together. Now, to be con-
sistent, Phenomebalism must deny Identity, for is not Identity 
a real union of the diverse' But how is it possible to deny 
Identity when Change must be recognised as an undeniable fact, 
for does not Change itself disappear if there is not a something 
which, while changing, remains equal with itselfT This survival 
and necessity of identical elements in the midst of change~forces 
met.aphyslcal conslderatlon, and introduces us, inevitably, to 
certain metaphysical reals. If we do not care to face the im-
plicatiQn, and fall back on laws which alone persist and which 
a ppear in successiowa of fleeting elements, we fare no better, 
for we must still answer the question as to what are these laws. 
Are they permanent, real essences! If so, we have made no ad-
va~ce. Are they hypothetical, that is, in themselves merely 
possibilities, actual only when found in real presentationsT 
But, as possibilitiea, they are beyond presentation and are 
nothing at all. In the end, "we can say of them only that we 
do not know what they are; and all that we can be certain of 
is this, that they are not what we know, namely, given phen-
omena~ The words of Bradley do not go far wide the mark. He 
says: "The view transcends itself, of necessity, and it does so 
ignorantly and blindly. A little criticism has driven it back 
• 
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and has . left it with a universe, which must either be distinctions 
then 
within one presentat1oa, or elae aer• ~o.n.uense. 4nd/these .dis-
t1nc .tions:. arec., qui~e indefensible;.·. __ .. It we admit them, we have 
the 
to deal Kith/ •etaphysieal prohlem or the One and the Many; and 
we cannot admit them, because clearly they are not given and 
presented, but at least more or ~ess made. And what it must 
come to is this~that Phenomenalism ends in this dilemma. It 
must either keep to the moment ' ·s presentation and must leave 
there the presented entirely as it is given, and if so, then 
surely there could be no more scienoe; or it must become tran-
ccendent and launch out into a sea of mere preposterous incon-
eistencies than are perhaps found in any other attempt at meta-
physics. As a working point of view, directed and confined to 
the ascertainment of some special branch of truth, Phenomenalism 
is, of course, useful and quite necessary. And the metaphysieian 
whc attackc it when following its own business, is apt to fare 
badly. But when Phenomenalism loses its head and, becoming bla-
tant, steps forward as a theory of first principles, then it is 
real ly net respectable. The best that can be said of its presen~ 
(a) 
ations,is that they are ridiculous". 
It Phenomenalism, as ~n affair of thought, is logically 
impossible, as an affair of life it is unendurable. "Was it by 
chance that Comte, in the end, set himself to work with heart 
and soul tc create new idealsT Was it by chance that both Mill 
and Spencer, at the end o:f their laborious days, :felt pain:fully 
a. Appearance and Re~11ty; Sannenschein, 1906. pp. 126-7. 
th~ ~imitations of the solution which they offered--that thus 
all the leaders of Positivism were impe~led by their own natures 
. (a) 
to transcend their own point of view"? The answer is to be 
found in the demands made by ~1fe and life's activities and 
aspirations, and not in the training or temperament ot the pa~ 
tioular individual. The question here is supremely one of arcus-
ing and coordinating all our powers. Thus it becomes impossible 
to renounce ultimate goals. A doctrine which emphasises our in-
ability to pierce beyond the surface of things, and heaps scorn 
upon all endeavor which has for its aim contact with the Ab~ 
solute and Eternal, is bound to produce such an unutterable 
emptiness that no normal nature can finally acquiesce. Within 
certain limits,man may treat nature as something external, but 
he cannot permanent~y maintain such an attitude towards his fe;b-
low men and himself. He finds "eternal values" supremely necess-
ary. Morality must be more than conv•ntion,and truth more than a 
passing advantage. To this, Mach himself bea~s witness. In various 
statements he finds place for an ultimate goal and an abiding 
content. Speaking ot the many attempts to so~ve certain prob-
lems in geometry, he says: "It is an elevating example that 
these men give us, when, fer centuri8s, driven forward solely 
by the desire to knew-to arrive at scientific explanation-
they seek tor the intellectual source of a proposition, con-
cerning whose accuracy neither the theorist nor the 'Praktiker' 
has up to the present time earnestly doubted. With expectation 
a. Eucken; The Life of the Spirit: Putnam, N.Y. ~909. p.324. 
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we follow the perseve~ing manifestations of the ethical power d 
th~ desire for knowledge and, with rejoicing, observe how the 
investigatort by way of many mistakes and false conclusions, 
(a 1 
gradually" approaches true and abiding results. This recog-
nition of an activity driven forward simply and solely by the 
desire to discover truth is at farthest remove frQm the con-
caption of "self- preservation" as ultimate, and gives the word 
'true' a content far richer than that sup plied by a point of 
view which makes it merely relative to prevailing circUmstances. 
- 3 -
We have fGund Mach's conception of the 'essence' of know-
ledge decidedly unsatisfactory. The very natur~ of the problam 
forces it out beyvnd itself and off ers us a point of departure 
for the critical oonsideration of all phenomenalistic thinking. 
It may not, however, be superfluous to inquire flkrther into the 
various elements which lead up t o this fina l result.From the 
new angle of vision,we will discover t h e same transcendence and 
the same pointing forward to a solution which, at once, satisfies 
the native dialectio~and better accords with all the facts. 
Phenomenaliem may take the form of Idealism or aealism. 
With Mach the doctrine has been t e rmed a "subjektloser Objektiv-
ismus". The 'elements' which mak e up the entire world are all 
objectified. Everything is placed on the outside. The subject, 
in any real sense, disappears--is ruled out. The reason for this 
a. E.u.J. 306. 
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ext~rnalising is not far - to seek. Mach re~gnfses the near so ip~ 
sistio consequences of.his doctr1n~1 and wishes, if possible, to 
save himself from such results. He falls back on the one alter-
native possible.It is evident that the tendency is decidedly 
materialistic, but with that we are not here concerned. We wish, 
rather, to consider the fact that knowledge is brought to full 
fruition ind~pendent of any coordinati ng and unifying principle. 
Is this possibl~T Or has Mach overlooked an indispensable fact, 
a fact whose insistency annihilates any conception which re-
fuses to find a place for it among the items fundamental to its 
existence? Is th~re such a thing as knowledge from the realistic 
point of view? Are things given1 or ar~ they madeT Is the subj~ct 
a phase.-a point o! view-- or is it a conditioning cause? 
We first call ~ttention to Mach's conception of the nature 
of thought, and the manner in which he fails to recognise what 
seems to be a fact of the most outstanding character. Mach fails 
to determine correctly the relation of thought to experience. 
Things are not given to us. We do not stand over against the 
outer world a.s mere passivities. Things are not brought into us. 
A critical examination of what we know leads us, inevitably, to 
this result. In the simplest and most elementary sxperiences 
thought manifests itself as an activity of a very definite and 
distinctive character. The sense fact, in every case is 
tranaeended. The impressions are worked over and given a eon-
tent and meaning which was, in no way, original to them. A tra•a-
• 
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forming power is at work~which leaves our sensations otheP than 
i~ found them. Our ideas cannot be exhausted in the 'given'. They 
possess a significance and legality all their own. They supply 
content t~and complete experience, and do not mepely copy off 
the same. They denote, in every case, a surplusage--a something 
over and beyond. They are intelligibles)and are so constituted 
by the peculiar activity of the understanding. Anyone can verify 
the truth of this if he will turn to his own ' experiences in a 
critical and intel l igent spirit. 
A few examples may serve to make this clearer, and exhibit 
the inescapable nature of the distinction. between what is in senas3 
and what is in thought. Nothing is more common in scientific in-
quiry than to reconstruct a souPce which has been lost, or to 
supply fundamental characteristics with all the certainty of 
first-hand facts. The actual facts are transcended in all 
scie r! tific inquiry. They are not me~~ly roead off. The mind itselt 
suppliGS completing content. For example, we bri~~G the ebb and 
flow of the tide into union with the action of t h e moon onthe 
earth; we .·are led to regard the sun as a sort of fiepy vapor; on 
the strength e~ reports, we trace a picture of times long van~ 
ished, or speak of constancy of energy in a closed system; and, 
in all these cases, we perfect our f~cts far mere than we copy 
them; we enrich them far more than we describe them; in a word, 
we broaden experience by means of the ideas which we bring to 
bear upon it. And what of the necessary work of criticism? We 
• 
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do not accept appearance aa ~inal. Rather, we compar~ what we 
term the apparent with the real, that is, the measured and the 
objecti~ied. We progressively eliminate the ~alae, and with 
greater certitude con~irm the seemingly true •• In a word, we 
continual ly deduce new results and laws, and in every way pro-
ceed as if it were cur prerogative to exercise a ~ordship over 
experience~rather than our fate to wait upon the behests of 
experience,and copy off, with slaviah imitation, the various 
dicta which i t daigns to have us know. 
And our ideas have independent legality. In no way do th,y 
find their norm in the facts which they are to represent. We 
place our concepts and Judgments in certain dete~ined relation~ 
according to certain logical principles, and in our work of 
research and discovery we exhibit and develop an ever increasing 
measure of spontaneity. The value of an experiment lies largely 
in the fact that it is preeeded by intellectual preparation~and 
conducted under the control of mind. We are well aware that 
reflection and calculation frequently lead to new ways in know-
ledge. And how are we t0 accoumt for the particular connections 
into which facts are for~ed? Do the various combinations come 
from the facts themselves, or are they something furnished by 
the mind? And does not a lar6• measure of the - meaning of an 
event, or the significance of a fact, lie in the eombination 
of the elements concerned? Moreover, in the very fact that we 
actually master and supplement the 'given', complete our consciaus 
• 
-38-
li!8 systematically and with planned intentioa,in a word,create 
knowledge on our own account, lies a great measu!'e ef the charm 
which attaches itself to intel l ectual endeavor • 
All this is a part and requisite of the most common item 
of knowledge. With the most minor experience7 it is t he same as 
with the mightiest intellectual effort. Every act of observation, 
i! it is t o have meaning, entails intel lectual activ.i ty. Here, 
!or example, is a picture. I get pleasuJ:"te and satisfactLion from 
it. That is because it has meaning for me. But whence that mean-
ing? What ia the source of the content presented! Is it something 
merely given? We must answer in the negative. The facts demand it. 
True, the linea and colora are present to the eye. But they do 
not give the picture meaning. The meaning is not brought to me. It 
is contributed. It comes !rom myself. "What the eye gives is 
one thing, what we see or perceive is quite another". What is 
true of the picture~is a~so true of the printed page. All that is 
really given are oertain marks a nd colors. That., which gives 
content and value t o the book,is the contribution of mind. The 
m(ianing implies a self-activity, a spontaneous forth-putting. 
All this is overlooked by Mach in his doctrine of the 'given~ 
He fails to see that comp~etion of facts by understanding cannot 
b~ avoided. He overlooks the t:.Jental activity whereby ouJ:'t s8nsa 
data assume rational forms. The laws of association are con-
ceived as sufficient for everything that knowledge contaias. But 
the associational movement can g~ve us only certain mechanical 
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groupings and r~productions which, at best, fall far short of the 
demands made by knowl~flge. It is a matter of ordinary observation 
that things may chance togeth~rJand still remain void of rational 
connection. There lacks that element of necessity which enter& 
into all knowledge and makes it knowledg•. This is especially 
true of the repetition of experi~noe. The elements involved 
possess an order and fixity which the associat i onal movement is 
entirely unable to produce. The facts remain to the end mere 
psychological occurrences--individual and withou~ iog1cal sig-
nificance. Objectivity, which is the mark of all tru~ knowledge, 
is wanting. All this, we repeat, Mach overlooks. He fancies that 
there is nothing to be done but to group the impressions offer~d, 
to a~range the !acta brought to the mind. He solves the problem 
of knowledge by completely ignoring the elements fundamental to 
it. The data which he offers are "in strictness, particular, un-
qual ified 1mpressi~ns; that is 1they are impressions of nobody 
by nothing. And if the strictness is relaxed enough to allow the 
passive subjeet, then we have only particular impressions in 
the consciousness of a pabticular individual; and these admit of 
being variously associated. But the real problem still remains, 
namely, how out of these data to generate the subjective form 
(a) 
of knowledge and 1 ts objective validity". lfhen we see the pro& -· 
lem in this form 1we realise at once the inadequacy of the data 
offered by the associational order. For how are we to get the 
universal form from the accidentals peculiar to the 1ndiv1dualT 
- - ---= 
a. Bowne; Theory of Thought and Knowledge: pp.l6-l7. 
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How is that, which is my own ~roduct and possession, to assume 
meaning and value for everybgdy? Til l this question is answered 
the problem of knowledge remains untouched. The solipsistic im-
plications are not overcome. Nothing is reported and nothing 
dona, for there is no knowledge where the objective reference, 
as embodied in the judgment, is absent. 
This ignoring of the active moment in thought,is given extra 
point in the naive trust which Mach places in the certainty of 
sensations. These are just as they are. We have them or we do 
not have them, and, if we have them, we have them in dete r>mined 
and indisputable form. I see white,and no one can dispute it 
away frum me. The certainty of its pNJsence is absolute. In com-
parison with such sensations;t he significance of the intell1g-
1bles which I employ, for example, the atoma of oxygen or the 
waves of ether, is secondary. They are not beyond dispute, and 
the value attaching to them is i ndirect. 
Now the sole significance of this certainty cf sensations 
consists simply in the having of them. In no way can I pass be-
yond them, and prese.rve them in their original purl ty and per-
fection. To describe them, even to declare myself to have them, 
involves a referenoe which destroys them, for the word or act 
of though1may be shown to be unfair to t he facts concerned. 
And, if we choose to regard the reference itself solely 
as a 'given' or a possessed , ~e destroy tta logical charaote~ 
and nothing remains but the fact without proof or criticism~ Tha,, 
• 
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we perceive to what certainty is r~duced. That alone is certain 
which involves no intellectual operation, no matter how much 
~very such operation seems to establish or make possible a proper 
a ppr$c1ation. We mast be satisfied with experiencing states, 
events, bare facts. We are confined strictly t c the present 
moment. Certitude is not the result of conflict and struggle. 
Strife and opposition are impossible. But this means that every-
thing which gives certainty reality~is precluded. We possess a 
name without a content.Our assurance admits of no ap plication 
and no contrast, for compariaon presupposes judgment, and this, 
in t 1..1rn,passing, as it does, beyond the sensation as such, .. 
transcends and destroys the doctrine promulgated. And here the 
true nature of sensations comes into view. They are, in and of 
themselves, nothing absolute and final; nor are they delusions 
of the senses. They are, rather, something to be further treated 
and ordered, something capable of development, but also something 
in need of criticism and correction. 
The above conception leaves us where we began. With it we 
cannot get beyond the individual. The problem of u~iversal val-
idity remains unsolved. Scientific knowledge is impossible. MoreT 
over, the conception brings us face to fac e lfith ·· .a .fact -w:q.ieh 
•• thought to ignore, but which has been insistently pressing 
for recognition. Modern psychology reveals sensations as products 
of a scientific analysis. Thus, in our examination of the giV$n 
in conscicusness, W@ uow._ •• ~1~over el~enta. S~ple oolors, 
---- - ---=== 
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tones, etc. never come to vi8w. ~ we find ~ thes8 only by way 
of a precess of separation and cumparison. The really given, 
that is,the directly given,are not sensations or complexes o~ 
sensations, but rather ideas in determined order of coexistence 
and succ•ssion, in manifold and intricate combinations. In a 
word, inves tigation brings to light a something already more or 
lass d8veloped. The question ~hen arises as to how we shall 
separate that which originates in matter from that added by the 
individual on the ground of his own peculiar development. Again, 
do~s the originally given--that which our investigation reveals--
belong to the matters of fact with which tne final WoPd is sup-
posed to rest? Whatever position we may take, j we must regard 
thought as active and fundamental. The content of consciousness 
is not immediate in character. There is revealed a set of re-
lations, varied in form and order. These demand logic a l p roof, 
and presuppose a self-activity 1which makes sensations seccnda~y 
and derived. 
Thought, then, is not the passive affair which Mach has 
chusen to assum8. It is an activity which does not require proof 
as a provisional hypothesis, but which rather demands recognition _ 
as a fundamental fact. With this in mind, we may look more nar~ow­
ly,. at Mach's reduction of the subject to one of the world's 
8 l ements. Are the conditions of know~edge to be found . 1n the 
obj&ctiv' 6rde~, or ,' is ~ this order insufficient for the task i m-
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posed in every act cf knowing? 
The question is almost answered before we begin. So soon as 
we recognise th~ true nature cf knowledge and the character of 
the judgment as embodying and expressing our a pprehension of 
truth, we perceive the inadequacy o f the claim here entered. Te 
d~fine knowledge in terms of a passive ccnsciousness and an 
associational movement,.is to overlook that which is evid&nt in 
every item of kn9w-l edge, namely, its objectivecharacter. KnowL- . 
·'. /". 
,. •/ ~ 
. edge is ev~lJation.In every Judgment we pass beyond the m~re, 
b are factual. An d ev&.{'y true judgment is a unity. Our question, 
then, becomes one of considering what is requisite to suc h a 
unity. It is clear that simple states of consciousness will not 
suffice. These states must be transcended and held together in 
one act of thought. We need not merely states of consc~ousness1 
but also consciousness of states. What is to satisfy this need? 
Mere a s sociation is not sufficient, tor association itsel f 
depends on something which transcends it,and for which it is 
something. Lcoking squarely at facts, and recalling what we have 
learned regarding the true nature of thought, we recognise that 
there must lie behind the judgment, as bearer cf knowledge, a 
self as ita supreme condition--a subject permanent and equal 
with itselll in all ita ehanging states. If Mach choose to pay 
out scorn to the demand for such a selt,it is because he fails 
to understand what such a self means, to discriminate between it 
and the ~ypostasizations of ' mechanical scie..nce • , Re.mairilng,. as 
/ 
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he does, on the seaae plane, he is unable to acknowledge as real 
anything which cannot be presented to intuition. Logical necess-
ity counts for nothing. But can the self be so treated? Is it 
not another outstanding fact which the open eye cannot avoid'!' 
When vre see clearly :.we find it to be one of t he s1.1res t · i terns of 
experience. It is beyond question, and, instead of being a con-
ception deserving the contempt of 'scientific' thinking, it is 
the postulate of all science and claims scientific recognition. 
"Whenever the intellect is steadied and focussed for exact state-
ment, it affirms with the utmost ce~tainty, that all we see !inda 
its support and reality in an existence within it, or beyond it, 
(a) . 
whivh is self-centlired and abiding". "I am not thought, I am 
not action, I am not feeling: I am something 'that thinks and 
acts and feels'. The self1 cr I 1 is permanent, and has the same 
relation to all the succeeding thoughts, acts, and feelings 
(b) 
which I call mine". This is a fact revealed in thought itself. 
If we approach the problem from the standpoint of Descartes, 
we may say that we can doubt everything but this, for to doubt 
here is to annihilate the possibility of doubt itself. It is 
the subject which doubts, and it is conscious of the fact. The 
subject, therefore, is the logical presup position of the matte r 
of doubt. And it is the presupposition of every expression and 
formulation of knowledge. The actual act of knowing, if examined 
without bias or distortion, wil l inevitably conduct us to a 
subject other than, and distinct from, the object as such. It is 
a. Bowne; Philosophy of Herbert Spencer: p.33. 
b. Quoted from Thos. aeid in "Theory of Thought and Know.Ledge" 
(Bownii}, p.27. 
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th&~ subject which forms the starting point and unifying center> 
of all knowledg&~. Kant has shown us this, .if not without cer-
tain shor>tcomings, yet so as to for>ce upon us the truth and 
necessity of the conception. He asserts that an "I think" must 
be abl&~ to accompany all my representations if I am to become 
conscious of them as my representations. The judgment "I think" 
is the vehicle of all concepts. He says further: "We can, how-
Giver, use as t he foundation of such a science(transcendental 
psychology)nothing but the single, and in itself perfectly empt~ 
rGlpresentation of the I, of which we cannot ev.en say that it is 
a concept, but merely a consciousness that accompanies al l con-
cepts. By this I, or he, or it(the thing) which thinks, nothing 
is represented beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts =:x, 
which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, 
and of Which, apart fr>om them, we can never have the s~lghtes~ 
concept, so that we are really turning round 1t ~n a pGlrpetual 
circle, having alrGlady to use its representati cn, before we c.- can 
form l any judgment about it. And this inconvenience is really 
inevitable, because consciousness in itself is not so much a 
repr>esentation, distinguishing a particular object, but really 
a form of representation in general, in so far as it is to be 
called knowledge, of which alone I can say that I think scme-
(a) 
thing by it". 
This is the logical presupposition which language so 
efficiGlntly hides, and whici:_ ~s fr>equently lost sight uf in t~ 
a. Kant; Critique of Pure Reason( Max Mueller's Trans~ation, 
Second Ed1tion;lQQ5. ):p.282. 
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paychological act of knowing. Quite naturally it cannot be 
grasped as an individual subject. It appears rather as an over-
individual--a universal consciousness--a final point of refer-
ence to which, logiva.lly, the constitution of the wor.id may be 
conducted. It is, according to Kant, no reality but rather an 
abstraction, a product won from ideal acts of knowing. Its sig-
nificance is solely epistemological, but fer the purpose which 
it serves it is absolutely indispensable. 
The significance and function of the subject in respect to 
the problem of knowledge may be clearly seen if we compare the 
epistemological 'subject' with other and lower conceptions. 
We may entertain a conception of the subject which makes it in-
elude the mind and body of man. Over against this there stands 
the object as that which exists in space beyond the human body. 
Again, we may conceive of the subject so as to leave the physic& 
being of man in the world of objects. Finally, even the psychical 
facts may pass intc the objective, and leave behind only the 
epistemological subject as the last concept of the subject, and 
this represents that which, from no point of view, can become 
o b ject. It is the presupposition of all knowle~ •, and, in the 
very nature of the case, cannot itself become the object of 
knowledge. 
For the first two conceptions of the subject Mach is able 
to find a place but refuses to recognise the third. He persists 
' i r1 ignoring the over-individual, and tries to account ~_ for kno 
=====--
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..• dge without taking in tv account that wi thcut which all knowl-
~. edg~ bec~mes impossible. 
It is from the subject that knowledge begins. This does not 
mean that the subject creates kncwledge,nor that reality can 
be reduced to t he level of our individual desires or points of 
view. We must not lose sight of the fact that kbowledge always 
implies transcendence of t he individ,-Ial, This is the rr..eaning of 
knowledge, and it is .for this vemy reason that the mere psycholog-
ical 'ego' proves inadequate. Of itself it can provide no true 
jud~nent. On the ground of it alone,no abiding distinctions are 
possible between the true and false. That which we grasp as 
r-eality is constituted. It is the judgment which ! 1rst· brings 
. L ·: • 
this to expression, and here truth andc errer;, fi:rst .emer-ge. Ob-
j ectiv~ real! ty, the material for all science, ,. is nota something . 
I 
on its own account. From beginning to end it is deeply penetrated 
by the activity of a knower. Intuition and thought everywhere 
interpenetrate. 9ar.eful .analysis is always necessary for the 
separation of fcrm and content. In experience,neither one is 
wanting. And so cur world does not stand before our gaze ready 
and finished. It is rather a task, and that tas k is one of pen-
etrating the given material with a universal content, so that 
the 'individual to me' has ~ the value of a 'common to all!. The 
world is 'Ichhaft'. In that fact lies the possibi~ity of c omi ng 
to a knowledge of it. Objective validity i s assured only through 
subjectivity. The things out of which our reality is constituted 
• 
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are not things in thems~lves3but structures which owe their form 
to the intellectuaL activity of man , and as such they are not 
the arbitrary products of individual a s sociation?but a union ox 
la~as valid tor all, and which all, who desire the truth, must 
recognise. The supreme condition of all knowl~dg~, and a fact 
of the most patent character, is a subj~ct, one and abiding, 
which, in certain deteMDined forms of thought, evaluat~s and 
formulates the 'given'. 
-4-
It ie our purpose in what follows to show briafly how the 
facts above mentioned force Mach's Sensualism beyond itself, am 
insert into his philosophy elements which vacate hia entire 
position. 
It is significant that Mach recognises understanding as 
vital to th~ constitution of our "Weltbi~d". While he retains 
understanding as one of the senses, he makes the concession of 
ascribing to it a certain uniqueness among its fellows. He says: 
"We possess a sense which~···· is richer than any other. This 
is our understanding. It holds high rank among the senses. It 
alone is able to establish a durable and satisfying 'Weltan-. 
" scha~g'. From the time of Galilee on,the mechanical 'Weltan-
" scha~ng' has been a power fer knowledge. But now it must give ( a) 
way to a freer manner of looking at things". It is in a remark 
appended to this statement that there appe•¥8 a word which lifts 
a. P.v. 115. 
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the understanding out of the category in which Mach has p~aced 
it."This(the fr~er way of lGoking at th1ngs)will, of itself, 
result in the expression of the dependence of the natural phen-
omena upon each othe r in terms of mere nume r ical ralations,rather 
than in terms of space and time". 
Now, we bear in mind that Mach's conception calls for a 
.monism which ~liminates all qualitative differences. His elements 
are 'gleichw~rtig' Everythi ng is fitquivalent to ever"7tP.ing elae. 
If this doctrin~ is to remain Sfitlf-consistent_,number's must take 
their p~ace among the various sensations representing the real 
fi.!.&ments of the copy which we maka of the world. But can numbe r-a 
be so r&duced? Are they not, rather, conceptual formations of 
ths understanding? Is not the presupposition of all number the 
consideration of a content as constant? And does the sensation 
know anything of such constancy? "For the question is not how 
the numerical activity begins, or whether it always begins, or 
whether it often has only a crude and obscure development. These 
are psychological questions which concern only the temporal order 
of development; they do not touch the logical question as to 
what is involved in the numerical activity, whenever' and how-
( a) 
ever it may begin". This numerical activity, as implying unity 
and the power of supplying unity, cannot belong to the sensuous 
order. Thus, while t•fit task of science is, beyond doubt, to 
expres,, ~. · . .. 'o j means of numerical relations, the de-
pendence upon each other of hap peninss in nature, the right to 
a. Bowne; Theory of Thought and Knowledge: pp. 71-2. 
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posit the task, and the possibili t ;>r of fulfillin s it, can never 
be adduced from a sensual istic imag ing of the world. 
To save a sbtuation which he cou.L d not ignore, Mach a s sumes 
c e rtain "functional" re l ations as existing between the elements. 
In answer- t o the object i on that his sensatlons l eave thing s too 
much in the air, he rumarks: "On the contrary, I must call at-
tention to the fact that, so far as I am concepned, the world 
is no mer8 sum of sensations. Rather{ I apeak expr~ssly of 
a) 
functional re l ations of the elements". But what do functional 
rel ations signify'!' Does not their acceptance do away with : a . 
sensationalistic philo sophy? Observation knows nothing of necess-
ary connections. Hume has made this plain for a .Ll t i me. Bu t 
can functional dependence eliminate the element of necessity? 
A sensationalist who remains tpue to his own logic must see,in 
al l !unctions, merely the arbitrary products of men, though it 
does n o t lie in his p ower to make t h em constitutive faotors of 
(b) 
th~ world. "Observations alone sup ply no organic knowl edge". 
But Mach is not wil l ing to regard the sense i mpressions 
as merely arbitrary. He declares himself for their legal de-
pendence upon each other. He speaks of a body, seen by one per--
son in a ce r tain way, as under necessity of being perceived in 
simi l ar manner> by every o ther" p er"son. The a c ceptance of a sub-
stant ial condition of perception external to sense has no other 
significance than that "similar equations, as they exist be-
tween the closely cohering e l ements which represent my e go, a l ae 
a. A. d. E. 283. 




find placflt between the elements of o ther e g os,. whose representation. 
(a) 
fac i litates my understa nding of the world". 
For Mach, the only p e rmarJent thing is the law which uni tea 
the e l emants. He says: "We obse r ve, in the first placfi, simple 
constancies of individual elfltments, then the spatial and temporal 
union of these elements, and, last l y, universal constancies of 
union. Repeated and careful observation teaches that individua l 
elements, in and of themselves, are not c onstant. If they have 
the appearance of c onstancy, it is only because o! the c hance 
stability o! other elements united with t h em. Nor does absolute 
permanency belong to the spatial and temporal uni on. Thus, there 
remains only t h e universal pe~manence of the union itself. And 
if we reckon the sensations of s pace and time as among the ele-
menta, all constancies of union are produced by means of the 
(b) 
mutual dependence of el :nents". In place of an absolutely 
permanent thing we have only "constancies of reaction, constancies 
of union or condition. Every physical permanent is a l ways and 
entirely the outcome of the f a ct that one or several equations 
are fulfilled--that a law abides in and through a~l passing 
(c) 
events". "If the collective sensuous element~ could be 
measured, we would say that body consists in the ful fil l ment 
of certain equations existing between the sensuous elements. 
(d) 
These equations or relations are, thus, the peculiarly constant". 
Let us grant the truth of this. The question remains, how-
aver, as to wh~ther t h ese "enduPing laws" and "cons tant rela tions" 
F=======~~--~-
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b. E.u.J. 270. 
c. W'L. 342. 






can be reconciled with such unqualified empiricism as we find in 
Mach. Mor~over, ar~ laws accessibl~i to the senses? We must give 
a negative reply. Mach brings a rational element into play, and 
this element, while bringing his system into line with facts, 
undermines it as sensationalism,and leads : throughcut,to scept-
ical results. The recognition of the nece s sity of finding :.mi ty, 
and t h e demand that this unity be more than a chance an d arbit-
rary affair, de r endent f6r its being upon certain practical 
necessities, forces thinking beyond the position taken by Mach, 
repudiates the propriety of his phi loscphy,and puts it entirely 
out of commission. Whatever else may be left to set t le, it has 
becoma apparent that the problem under discussion cannot be 
settled oo the sense plane. Io the activity of the understanding 
is to be found the bond of union nedessary for the elevation of 
"the rhapsody of impressions to the value of an experience"; here 
we discover the pow~r which lifts the manifold of intuition into 
synthetical. unity. lt'or sensualism this is an impossible task, 
and th~ more spirited the attempt to make itself suffici~nt for 
the facts of experience the more apf arent qecomes its inadequacy 
~ 
and superficiality, the more complete becomes the mastery of the 
principles of the ~ritical philosophy. Mach's treatment leaves 
him in the place of one who, repudiating the Kantian doctrine 
of thought as autonomous and constitutive, is forced by the very 
progress of his discussion to make tl!:De Kantian principles .tune··· 
~ental to knowledge and experience. In a word, Mach remains a 
• 
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ve meta:pt rya :'"0 fna~· SC"!ence, 
but fails to D8aoh:,a <:.proper!ty .:. c·ritical attitude. He casts aside 
the concap tion of a substance in which qualities inhere~but ac-
cepts without question certain determining elements as simply 
present u.nd given. At the very best his attempt is a compromise. 
When Mach puts laws in the place of matter he does not, as he 
seems to think, simplyreplace metaphysical concepts by empirical. 
In the placfi cf transcendent thing s he puts transcendent functions. 
These functions possess, in their "Gesetzmaessigkeit",a character-
istic which makes it impossible to find a pl.ace for t h em in any 
logical. empirical system. And if the furtm~r question of reaction 
be c c,nsidered, and Mach answll)rs in terms of changing elell.lents, we 
have the unsatisfactory spectacle of the world resolving itself 
intv mere laws. In the doctrine of reactions,all that remains to 
react are the reactions themselves, and we feel convinced that, 
accepting the same, we do not remain true to facts, and are not 
in the way of making much progress. 
Thus, at the close of our discussion, we are face to face 
with a very contradictory situation. We find a doctrine,whose 
implications are strongly Relativistic, straining and striving 
after an Absolute; a conception of all things as in "eternal 
flow", seeking to r:rovide for a united and constant; a system 
of Phenomenalism-of elements as sole and final reality- falling 
back into a position as naive and untenable as that from wh1•n it 
endeavors to rescue thought;a Sensualism of the most thorough-
• 
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going character,employing,for the furtherance of its own argu-
mentation, principles directly contradictory to its own point 
of view; a persistent ignoring of facts only to be lliastered, in 
the end, by those same facts. And the whole affair is posited as 
'necessitated'. Of what then is this ccnsidered to be the im-
plication and cutcome? What is that theory of method which sup-
· plies foundation for the philosophic results just considered, and 
what measure of truth and value belongs to itT To this question 






The method cf consideration discussed in the foliowin g pages 
is decidedly outspoken and striking and well m$rits our attentioQ 
' 
We may characterize it, on the one hand, as "psycholcgisch-
bioloeisch" and, on the other h and, aa "entwickelung s - geschicht-
lich". It . is cur purpose to inquire whether such a way of deal-
ing with things is true to all the facts coneerned, and if it 
n~ce s sitates the conclusions discus s ed in the preceding section. 
The methcd presupposes a conception already noticed. To 
science is given the simpl~ task of description. The one thing 
which the investitator of nature deems worth while ie the knew-
ledge of facts. Every t hing else is an intellectual detour in-
strumental in the winning of such knowledge. "If all the individ-
ual facts were 'immediat e ly' accessible to us in such manner and 
measure as we desire a knowledge of them, no science would ever 
have originated. It is only because of our confined and limited 
{a) 
condition that the material must be placed in order". This 
ordering constitutes the goal of science, and this goal is pure-
~y p ractical. Only in the course of develGpment do specific 
theoretical int~rests arise and find p~ace. These are always 
capable of reduction to the practical, and of being conceived 
as instrumental. To repeat: "We can regard every scientific in-
terest as a mediate biological interest" • 
It is by way of this conception that science passes over 
into the category of the phenomenal. It loses all p~rruanence and 
ideality1 and simply repres~nts a phase and stage of the whole 
a. A. d. E. 31. 
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dev~lopmental movement. Together with the entire activity of man 
' 
it has its source in the desire for self-preservation. Man is 
one with the lower animals. Self-preservation is his supreme aim 
and so l e endeavor. "The collective life-events of the individual 
are reactions in the interest of self-preservatign, and the 
(a) 
turning aside into the life of ideasJis only a part of the forme~. 
The law of continuity and the principle of economy, are near 
products of this conception, for these are elements integral to 
the doctrine of development. On the other hand, if we apply the 
principles of continuity and economy of thought,they support the 
contention that, in the lii'e u f thought, there must be foun·d a 
place for the concept of de~elorment. 
Ae .concerns th~ first pojdt. of view, we find that the e c n-
··cept of development implies an attem;: t to account for all the 
qualities and reactions of lifeJby selective adaptation to the 
manifold occurrences in the environing world. Adaptation comes 
to pass without break,and in the most economical manner. In 
other words, qualities which we find present under certain con-
ditions are not cast away and replaced by others when new con-
ditions arise, but are progressively modified and re-~ormed, the 
modification taking place in the most economical . fashion, and 
going only so far as the new condit i ons necessitate. 
On the other hand, if we begin with the principl.es of con-
tinuity and econcmy, we find, a Gcording to Mach, proof that 
these principles, which stand for the finally developed con-
are actuallYc fulfilled 
a. E.u.J. 107, 110. The same though t is found repeatedly in 
all Mach's writings, especially in "Brkenntnis u. Irr>tum" and 
"Analyse d. Empfindungen". ' 
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in sci•ntific thinking and its development. 
v~ry briefly stated, Mach's weightiest statements run some-
what as follows: 
1. The origin of the life of c onsciousness is thoroughly and 
entirely economic. Self-preservation is the instinctive and con-
trol l ing demand. Thus, there is urgent call for the adaptation 
of the react i ons of an organism to the events of the external 
wcrld. As a consequence, it comes tc passJthat ) because of the 
increasing complexity of the conditions of life, the manifold-
. weighty 
ness o:r the actual becomes far greater than the mu.nber of~bio-
logical reactions. Thus, reactions must take place without ex-
act consideration of existing differences. A group of related 
facts is made the unit of ecnsideration,and the measure of ne-
cessitated adaptation. Th~ resultant reaction is, c in -large de-
gree, undifferentiated.J_but : 1 f it prove sufficient for the 
practical needs connected with the situation, the entire move-
ment bears the cha!'llcter of sparing and economy. Here we have 
the first beginnings of the conceptual life. The facts of "like 
reactions", in a~ccrd with the demands of economy, are grasped 
under the form of an 'idea' and forced into a symbolic combin-
ation. By this means, consciousness becomes the type of a more 
or less imperfect physical apparatus,answering to the happen-
ings of the outer world only within a limit~d areaJand according 
(a) 
to but few directions. 
2. In ether respects,consciousness bears the character of an 




economical instrument. Even whe n it has acquired a certain stab-
ility as regards id&as 1it is wei ghted with demands made by new 
facts. To meet these demands~it do e s not form new ideas but takes 
those which are already present and adapts them to the new pro~ 
lems. This modification or transformation is completed with the 
least possible expenditure of effort, and in no larger measure 
tha D the new facts necessitate. Moreover, the ~riginal thoughts 
themselves are made more secure and stable. It is this movement 
which Mach desi gnates as the Principl~ of Continuity or the Prin-
( a) 
cip l e of Permanence. 
From the above it will be seen that Mach discriminates be-
tween a) the adaptation of thoughts to facts,and b) the adapt-
ation of thoughts to each other. As . regards the fi r st, he speaks 
of the adaptation as an imaging and typifying of facts in thought~ 
It is this which first makes possible 'sufficient' adaptation--
sufficiency being measures in terms of self-preservation. "In 
order to place ourselves in some kind of relation to our surround-
( b) 
ings we need just this thing--a .'Weltbild'"· 
As regards the seoond--the adaptation of thoughts to each 
other-- he aaya: "The ideas,thus, adapt themse~ves to the facts 
in t hat they exhibit a copy sufficiently exact,and meeting, in 
a sufficient degree, the various biol ogioa~ needs, but this ex-
actness of the copying does not reach further than the moment-
ary int~rests and c onditions demand. Since, however, these in-
terests and demands change from case to case, the results of the 
a. E.u.J. 110, 134, 298. 
b. W1 L. 394. 
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adaptation in the various circumstances 7 do not exactly agree 
amon g themselves. The biological interest now impels to the co~ 
rection by means of each other of the various res ul ts found in 
the images. The best possible compromise is sought after and 
(a,) 
effected". Thus, adaptation of thoughts to each other is the 
further problem,by way of which thought is fully satisfied, and 
"this demand is fulfil l ed by the union of the Principle of Per-
( b) 
manance with that of the Sufficient Differentiation of Ideas". 
3. If thinking proceeds as Mach here conceives, it fol i ows that 
the principles of Economy and Continuity must find application 
in the sciences. Mach is not content to let the implication 
rest, but employs all the wealth of his scientific and historic 
knowledg e towards its ·elucidation. He regards the point as of 
considerab~e wei ght,and worth c a reful and repeated argument. We 
give balcw some of the proofs and illustrations which he offers. 
a). Scientific thinking shows itself as the type of Economy 
and Continuity. Newton offers ilJ.us tration of the fac t , in his •, 
conception of the planets as bodies thrown off, and in his modif-
ication of the constant wei ght to the pull of gravity. Fourier 
formulates a theory of currents of heat,and, for this purpose, 
modifies the vibrat ~ ons of strings. Again, the idea of a rec~ ­
tilinear propagation of light,was simply broadened by the incor-
poration of the refraction exponent,in order to find place for 
the new facts of deflection and refraction. The furthe r dis-
ccvery1 that every color demands a refraction exponent,necessitated 





!urther modification. "Finally, there is everywhere recognised 
in the overpowering manifoldness of the phenomena of light, the __ 
spatial and temporal periodicity of light,and the dependence of 
the celerity of its propagation on matter. This goal of survey-
ing a territory with least expenditure, and of copying all facts 
by means of an intellectual process, may rightly be named an 
(a) 
economical precess and goal". Through its formation of 
hypotheses,science makes progress according to the type of con-
tinuity. Hypothes~s are, in the first place, taken from the ex-
isting stock of known experiences. The results deduced are then 
compared with new fact~ and, finally, the particular hypothesis 
is modified to correspond with the results of this comparison. 
b). As we proceed we discover that the various aids em-
played in our work of investigation serve the principle of econ-
omy. This is especially true of mathematical science. But it is 
also true of all methods leading to fruitful results. The fund-
amental mtithod is one of change. "The method of change brings 
before us similar cases of facts r which, in part, possess elements 
(b) 
of a common nature,but which, in other respects, are different~ 
Comparison brings to light both similarities and differences. 
It at the same time leads attention to the highest abstractions 
and finest distinctions. And, since comparison forms the cere 
of all inductive process and all experiment, we perceive that 
this entire "Methodik" aims at continuity, for the intention of 
the comparison is to recognise the new,as arising out of the 
a. P.V. 223-4. 
b. P.V. 258. 
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elements of the old,which, in the last instance, have been mod-
ifi9d to suit thQ exigwncies of the occasion. Thus, the entire 
procedure is as truly economical as was the casw in the fopmation 
of hypotheses. 
c). If we turn to a consideration of the results achieved 
by science, namely, to Concept, Law, Theory, we find everywherQ 
correspondence to the principles of Economy and Continuity. The 
laws of nature, as was said above, have simply t h e economical 
task of sparing the knowledge of individual facts. In every 
single case we must note that the law joins typical cas•s by 
means of a thought. Given certain conditions, expectation by 
( a) 
means of the law is regulated and narrowed. In other words, 
the law "fungiert" as a schema. The only need is the insertion 
of the special conditions. And since a law is recognised as a 
special case of a universal law, a schema is replaced by one 
more inclusive. What is said of law1 is also true of the con-
cept. The exact concept of natural scienc9 is the condensation 
within itself of labor economically performed and completed. In 
defining it,we consider characteristics which are to be, and co~ 
bine them according to law. Thus, the concept always has a for-
ward look. It has respect to future experiences. It et~nds fon aa 
attempt at diagnostic representation. We may say: "All physical 
laws and concepts are abbreviated chequas,frQquently enclosing 
(b) 
other cheques". The "mysterious power of science" 119S in 
their economic arrangement. :ls ·.formulations at the service of 
a. E.u.J. 441. 
b. P. V. 226. 
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axper1ence,they satisfy the demands of Cont1nuity,~nd correspond 
to the need of P~rruanence. In the~thought seeks to grasp the 
idea, which, in every change, oema1ns ··seil:f ... equai, and . ~wi t ·hout :i_ which 
' 1 
the change would lack unity and meaning. 
Such, then, is Mach's conc~ption of the origin and life of 
consciousness, and of the substance, development and goal of 
sciance. The method is evolutionary, psychological and economical. 
Granting it to be true to fact, doQS it necessitate certain 
philosophical conc~usicns? Are we shut up, therQby, to a par-
ticular theory of Thought and Reality? Or may the method be 
accQpt~d,and the essence of philosophy remain untouched? Even 
allowing that. th~~method enriches and animates philosophical 
consideration, does it,im any manner or measure,l~ad to a trans-
mutation of fina~ princip~~s of ~xplanation! w~ ~ shall ; answer th~ 
question first in general temms. 
-2-
A proper understanding of what method means will do much 
towards insuring corr~ct conclusions. When we perceive that it 
one does not 
is merely an instrument, a tool, we see that/Y· method/necessar-
I 
· ily exclude · all others. In the present instance, the method may 
be regarded as simply "neben" the specifically epistemological 
examination of the grounds~and criteria of knowledge, and, as 
such, remains indifferent so far as epistemological reference is 
concerned. On the other hand, if we assert that the epistemolog-
• 
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ical examination cannot be car ried t v completion without its 
aid, we mabi it vi tal to the entire si tuation~We a ssert that 
we cannot know the nature of thought as a faculty for the ac-
,, 
····=== 
quisition of truth,except en grounds of the biological, economical 
and psychological. Which point of view. is true to Mach's con-
ception of the method which he ~mphasizes? 
a). We may allow Mach's animating considerations~and still 
regard the problems proper to epistemology as entirely untou ched 
t h ereby. This is evident so long as we bear in mind that the 
psychological and epistemological are two who£ly different quest-
i ns. The one is a que stion of fact, the other a question of 
values. The former considers the life of c cnsciousness as an 
event, the latter as a faculty engaged in the apprehension of 
truth. Our peculiar problems begin with this latter conception 
of the mental life. We are under necessity of confess i ng that 
al l thinking, correct and incorrect, all judgmants and prejudice~, 
take course psychologically and according to the principle of 
continuity, no special factor or circumstanc e arising to pre-
vent. But there are other questions which are not thereby ex-
haus••d, and these latter questions have a special significanc~ · 
and must be settled before their own judiciary. For example, 
when is a course of thought to be regarded as continuous? Under 
what inner and outer conditions does it come to continuous in-
tellectual development? When is the result of a certain in~ .. 
tellectual consummation to be regarded as correct, independent 
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of the fact as to whethe r this has developed continuous l y oP 
discontinuously, economically OP otherwise? These questions 
serv~ to show that insight into the instrumental nature of laws 
and concepts1 by no means exhausts the quest i ons which may be 
asked concerning them. For these laws and concepts must be •val-
uated and a r rang ed in ord~P of i mportance; the fundamental con-
nsction batwe~n diffe r ent group s of facts, moving under the ~ · 
direction of simi l~ laws, must be ascertained; and it is not 
sufficient t o answer that we find a ll such operations satis-
factory and pl~asant. Th~ r~al question has not been touched. 
The point of view is secondary,and lacks finality. 
b). Now does Mach consent to regard his m(jthod simply as 'neben', 
or does he mak e it a.Ll suf ficient and necessary to the p(Jlution 
of the problems peculiar to epistemology and metaphysics? We 
consideP first his Principle of Permanence. According to it,cer-
tai n primitive suppositions aPe originally given. "The most 1m-
portant advances have constantly resulted,when it has been found 
possible to bring 1ht6 o·tni1IDU f$J 1e'able, forw,tn.at , which was known 
h ith e r to only instinctively". Ther~ was, in ~uch case, an adapt-
at i on to the facts of knowledg~ with minimum modification. Thus, 
the motion theory of heat, like the material conception of elect-
ricity, owes the appearance of justification which is ground 
for its existence~to an historical acc1dent.Even the purely 
concep tual and quantitativ~,are larg ely colored by reason of 
the manner o f their development. We may even say that sometimes 
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an entire discipline would have taken a .total ly different direct-
ion, except for some trifling historical circumstance; that the 
resul t would have been quite othe.r' concepts and conceptual systems. 
Frcm this point of view,the most exact and fundamantal becomes 
accidental and convenient, and an atmosphere of uncertainty, 
lack of finality and scepticism envelopes our intel l ectl:lal, 
ethical and aapirational ~ t te. This is the result whioh lies 
near at hand when the payohologieal and biclogioal are made con-
trol l ing and ul timate. Individual influences and accidents are 
given the value of the normative; knowledge and truth are ex-
pressed and exhausted in te~s of chance conjuncti ons; the . 
choicest and deepest categories of science,are reduced to the 
rank and worth of mere dependents, and the entire story of 
progress must be read in the light of the arbitrary and aimless. 
Adaptation and self-preservation are the interpreting powers of 
l ife's chief impulses and loftiest ideals. Science is a phen-
omenal product, and bears within itself nothing definite and 
certain. Results, everywhere, permit large play. In our know-
ledge of nature there is nothing determined, simply one out-
c ome a l ong side other possible outc omes, and all completely ey~ 
plicable on purely historical grounds. Absolute truth and ob-
jective necessity are alike denied. A point of view is true in 
so far as it sufficientl y adjusts us to our linvironment;,and 
satisfies OQr practical needs. The final word, we repeat, is 
a practica~ convention,and a rela tive satisfaction. The final 
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interest is self-prQservation. Such a view is necessitated only 
b~cause of the failure to see that the psychological is net 
necessary to, or sufficient for, the properly epistemological 
/ 
and metaphysical. When we read that there is no such thing as 
absol ute, unconditioned knowledge; that no assertion can have 
unqualified validity; that subjective convictions,and not ob-
jective certainty
1
is the only goaL possibl~ ~ven to the most 
earnest and protracted scientific endeavor, we perceive them to 
be the conclusions of one who has made the qu,;; st :l cns of origin 
and validity identical; who ma~es the associational movement 
sufficient for rational experience, and fancies that, in tracing 
the course of a mental event, he is establishing the proper 
character, range and criteria of knowledge. And all this we 
have seen to be false to fact. The sce ptical r~sults may arrive 
but they are· not logically necessitated. The:; may well enough 
be individual eonviGtiona, but t hey have no wa•,rant ei tn.a~ in 
reason o r experience. The "Eleruentenlehre" is not an implication 
or a necessitated result. It is the product of an undue emphasis 
and illegitimate application. The raising of a method, though a 
very common prGcedure, cannot be Justified. A critical exa.min-
ation of the life of thought a s the faculty of knowledge, in 
tePms of the economical and biological to the exclusion of every 
other way of consideration, is without .foundation and lacks 
constructive pow~r. 
If it should be said that the above interpretation fai l s to 
... 
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do justice to Mach's point of viaw,- we- reopen the discussion 
from a differ~nt angle. We begin with Mach's demand for a large 
measure of scientific stability, and interprwt his principles 
in the light of this demand. We see n find that his principles 
are insufficient and philosophically insignificant. 
The examination brings to the front Mach's assertions as 
counter-statements with the nece s sity of making proper discrim-
ination and giving due emphasis. For example, Mach says, on the 
one hand, that every development of a scientific thought, so 
far as it completes itself without break, is also econ cmic. This 
supplies us with a conception of Continuity, and asserts the 
close connection existing betwGen it and the Principle of Econ-
omy. But, on the othe r hand, we have the statement that we can 
arrive at entirely distinct and widely separated results by way 
of a like measure of continuity. It is this, as we have found, 
which makes him desire to effect an :.: efficient compromise be-
{ a) 
tween the results of the various a dap tations. But what is the 
logical implication? Is it not that mere continuity and economy 
are not sufficiently decisive? And if Mach attempts to assert 
them as suf ficiently decisive,he contradicts himself. "All the 
points of view of natural science which are of value,remain pre 
served" is an express statement rega."ded as interpretative and 
' 
fundamental. In harmony with this, is a deep concern for fast and 
p l ain certitude in all matters scientific. But the warrant for 
this concern cannot be carried into execution through the power 
- .= ,___ -




of mere continuity,, and this again, on Mach 1 s own a s s ertion, 
for he repeatedly affirms that, aftar this fashion, knowledge 
and error alike develop. To carry forward the same p ro cess of 
affirmation and negation,we mention ~ he fact that while Mach, 
in ha~ony with certain concessions, deprive s continuity cf co-
ercive authority, he stil l desires of science clearness, and 
characterises such clearness as the very goal of adaptation 
(a) 
"according to the law of continuity". 
It seems plain, in any case, that the demand for sufficie&t 
differentiation,necessitates a limited conception and application 
of the principle of continu.i ty. The peculiarly determining moment 
now is j that an :hnsuf:f.1ciant1-,8.daptati:on ~s ~'ti6 ' adaptation at all. 
Here th~ harmony between Mach's different points of view seems 
a gain restored. But, in the same moment, another question arises. 
What does the emphasis on th~ word 'sufficient' signify? We have 
seen that it may mean that the adaptation never results with 
any more finality and exactn(jss than is absol .:t tely nece ssary 
for t he occasion. But this means n o thing more than that, in the 
inductive sciences, knowledge must be wc r ked over f rom below 
tc .... , :· y _ .. : .. ,-. > t .- -·~.~ .. _-. l'~ ~"' c :- :· ~ ·. ! 
up; that what is received as valid~. to-day may, to-morroy, be 
recognised a s in need of correction; that we attain the goal 
of intellectual endeavor• slowly and by way of many mistakes. 
But to say this, is to reduce the considerat i on tc the level ~ 
a universally conceded fact; in no particulaP, and at no time 
is it vital to, o r can it be made t c interfere with, a deeper 
m~thod of consideration . Instead of working in t he int ~ rests o~ 
a . A • d. E. 48 • 
• 
-
excld.eion, Mach's principle falla into line with the customary 
theory, becomes m~rely a phase of it, a point of emphasis, a 
working basis. This is seen further in the statement that an 
adaptation is sufficient only at that time when it permits an 
imaging and typifyi-ng of the facts, that is, when the intentio:es 
of thought and the facts to which thought is related, ellist in 
a relation of consistency and harmony. This is just the sort of 
agreement which the ordinary intuition desires. For it the ab-
eolutely sufficient adaptation is that which leads t o no contra-
diction, which corresponds to eve r·y known and newly discovered 
fact within its range. This, 1n customary terminology, we denom-
inate knowledge or truth. And such adaptation is clearly ec on-
omical, for, since every other must faiL in certain cases, they 
must be insufficient, misleading and, consequently, not econ-
omical. From this point of view the criterion is, in its best 
estate, merely secondary. Even with the princip l e of ec onomy at 
hani we must first know whether a supposition agrees with col-
lective experience, that is, we must know whether it is true. 
Then, and then only, can we say without reservation that it is 
economical. With t h is reduct i on of the principle,every a pparent 
contradiction with the customary theory of induction disap pears. 
by economy 
The secondary role played/in investigation and generalisation~ 
is n o thin g specific, det~rmining and exclusive. It is wrong to 
draw the conclusion that adaptation of thoughts to facts~must 




nti ll permitted to carry on their investigations in in dicidual 
manner~and employ the method in dif f e rent ways. But "we will be 
able to compar>e these various scientific ef f orts with e a ch o the r 
a nd find the one as economical as the other. Economy wi ~l thus 
offer us an orientating point of view full of value. According 
(a) 
to this w~ conduct our scientific end&avo r ". A p roc&dure is 
seen as economical in the light of the resu~ ts achieved, but 
cannot be defined in t e rms of an evaluating principle. It is 
purely instrumental and relative. Economy is a normal demand. It 
stands for th~ desire to avoid the incongruous, to overcome the 
or not 
imp e rf&ct, to realise the ultimate, whether/this desire be ex-
hausted in terms of the biological. But when this is said, it 
i s sti l l left to the individual to make selection of means in 
terms of what he conceives to be the goal meet desired, the end 
most vrc rthy c:f at.t.ain!!'!Ant. Our . aims and ideals determine what 
we shall consider economical~ 
Thus, Mach's principles become philosophically insignif-
icant. They contain no necessary implications so far as knowl-
edg e is concerned. They have no s pecific value as foundation 
principles. At best they are il l ustrative, and in a reflective 
way, interp r etative. Mach ·himse l f says: "~s :an .· investigator, ;L _. 
am accustomed to attach the beginnings of investigation to the 
special, and to rise f r om this to the univ e rsal. This custom 
I also followed in examining the development of physical knowl-
edge. I was so determined because a universal theory of theory 
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was, ~or me, too difficult a task. Thus I directed my attention 
to individual phenomena; adaptation of thoughts to facts, adap+ 
tation of thou ghts to each other, economy of thought, comparison, 
1ntellectua~ axper1m$nt, permanance and continuity o f thought, 
etc. For ·me it was logical, and at the same time prudent, to 
regard vulgar thinking and science in its entirety as a biolog-
' 
ical and organic phenomenon, in harmony with wh ich ~ogical 
thought was considered as an ideal 'Grenzfall 1 • I shall not for 
a moment doubt that investigation may begin at both ends. From 
here out, one may see that I know well how to discriminate be-
who 
tween psycholoeical and lcgical questions. However, no one/will 
has carefully considered the logical analysis of the Newtonian 
/dare to reproach me with wishing to annihilate the dif f ere.1ce 
expositions in my mechanics, 'a) 
;betvreen natural) blind thought,and that . which is .J.. Ogica~. E.'ven 
if the l ogical analysis o~ all science lay, ready and prepared, 
before us, there still remains the biologico-psychological exam-
ination of its growth •••• This is a nfied which would not e x c l ude 
the p ossibility of once more analysing this exa.minatlcn in a 
(b) 
logical manner". 
We repeat,that ~ if this does represent Mach's true point 
of view,rather than a positi on forced upon him by a native 
dialectic and the facts of experience, he has affirmed nothing 
more than has already been said and agreed to,sc far as the 
epistemological is concerned. Would it be too much to say that 
he has labored hard to prove truisms? At best he has b u t i .1. lus-
trated the customary course of thought_. _His principlfis, as inter-
a. There is no cleavag e · anywh ere in the life c f consciousness. 
b. M. 537. 
-~ 
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preted above, affirm nothing so far as philosophy is conc& rned. 
If the sceptical significanae of the principles is asserted, and 
attempt made to exhibit the 'Elementenlehre' as the implication 
ot the 'economic' discussion, Mach continually contradicts him~ 
selt,and denies what must be regarded as the most weighty 
elements of his exposition. On the other hand, if we view things 
from the higher l~vel, the inadequacy and superficiality of the 
princip~es fer philosophical inquiry become increasingly mani-
fest. 
-3-
Our ge neral discussion of Mach's Theory of Method3 leaves 
the epistemological problem untouched. We have found a system 
welded into oneness only by reason of a psychological usurpation3 
and, if such usurpation be disc l aimed,a hiatus at once appears. 
Unive~sa~ly conside~ed, knowledge as a product of adaptation~ 
offers no deduction concerning the limitation of kno-.ledge. But 
another way of approach is possible. We may make inquiry fr~m 
the 1nd1v1dual and particular point of view, and may find limi-
tations necessitating a sceptical conclusion. We are now to con-
sider Mach's attitude towards mechanical physics1 and, in partic-
ular, his criticism of the various physical concepts. Here we 
find his theory at work and best suited to critical inquiry. 
In the part of this essay devoted to the "Elementenlehre" ,... 
we have already spoken of the fallacious nature of the reason -




garding it. We saw that Mach finds in these theories, and in the 
concepts which they employ, no independent value. They are merely 
economic representations of facts. Their value is relative. The 
hypotheses and concepts of mechanical sci~nce have no teleolog-
ica~ worth. They are instrumental. There is no absolute goal, 
simply means for the mastery of facts, and every function which 
goes beyond this,is exhibited as full of contradictions. 
There is no doubt that the mechanical physics considered, 
offer ed abundant material for criticism. They represented many 
and conf~icting points of vi~w. Moreover,systems were seen to 
be superseded -~~ply because of their economical unfittness. 
Even surviving theories were continually manifesting their ecoa-
cmic incapacity and insufficiency. Such a situation implied, or 
at l~ast suggested, some fundamental weakness. Search accent-
uated the lacm of clearness inherent in the concepts force, 
matter and motion. It also hit upon a reason for the a r. parent 
weakness and ambiguity. The scientific ideal was at fault. The 
task of explanation was too large. The concepts were deprived 
of t heir value because of too wide range of application. They 
were asked to solve a problem which was not properly theirs. 
So they were brought back within their proer sphere, as it was 
conceived, and were aplowed authority only in respect to their 
economic moment, since t h is it was which actual ly came into view. 
Mach falls in line with t h is general movement. In several 
places he attempts demonstration of the f act that exp lanation 
• 
-74-
is possible by hypotheses which, in the final analysis, contra-
di~t each other. The conclusion is evident. The hypothesis can 
decide nothing concerning the true and the false. A good illus-
tration of this is the theory that heat, in its ~s sence, is 
motion and not, as was earlier thought, mat t er. Mach points out 
' 
that th~ grounds on which this decision rests are not suffici~nt. 
It is simply a point of view. Accidental circumstance led to the 
choic~ of the fo-rmer theory. Economic reasons secure it validity. 
The heat hypothesis can be more easily put to work and be em-
played to more effect i ve purpose, but we cannot thereby conclude 
anything as to the necessary elimination of matter. The con-
ditionlng elements throughout,ar~ purely historical. A further 
illustration is found in the doctrine of electricity. Here we 
can arrive at two opposite results concerning the nature of the 
agent, and that with equal ease. In a word, the conception enter-
tained amounts to saying, that, if 'Ne are apt in the ap plication 
of certain conditions, we can bring almost every hypothesis into 
harmonious relation with phenomena. Thereby we pl~ase and sat-
isfy the imaginative faculty but, in no way, increase our stock 
of knowledge. 
The following words express Ma~h'a conception of the char-
acter and value of the hypothesis."It is a matter of complete 
indifference, and has not the least scientific value, whether 
we think of heat as a m~terial affair or not. We simply accept 
for the moment that all physical occurrences allew themselves 
• 
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to be carried back to molecular movements. But, in the act, 
what do we really do? We take the position that things which 
cannot be seen or tasted, which exist solely in our imaginattn 
and understanding, can be infected with the quali tie.s and re-
lations of that oapabi.e o.f being tasted. W& lay upon thcugh t 
the limitations of the seen and tasted. Why do we not r~present 
the molecular occurrences as musical? As a matter of fact there 
is a possible advantage in thinking chemical occurrences as in 
a space of more than three dimensions. Thus, the results may 
be established even without the mechanical theory. The latte~ 
(a) 
is not necessary. Frequently it is a positive hindrance". 
We may now understand whatever expositiuns Mach has to 
offer regarding the essence and kind of "Bilderhypothesen". It 
is in reference to them that Mach employs the expression "in-
direct description". Such a description is given when we say 
"the fact A behaves itself lik e an already known fact B, and that 
n o t in one particular but in ma ny or in all". There is he r e an 
a ppeal t o a description already g iven or now, for the first 
(b ) 
time, exactly an~ fully manifesting itself. 
Thus, Being is thought in terms of analogy. "In thought, 
in the place of a fact A, there is always placed another simpler 
or more familiar fact B~which can represent the former intellect-
ually but, just because it is another, at the same time cannot 
' (c ) 
represent the former". Here both the excel l ence and danger 
o~ hypotheses ~ppear. "What an unloading of di! figulty it must 
a. P.V. 268. 
b. P.V. 268. Cf. E.u.J. 23lf. 
0 • p. v. ~2ll.9.;. 
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affor-d when one can simply say; a. fact A, brought into oonsid-
eration, behaves its~lf, in many or in all particul ars, like a 
fact B already known. Instead of one simple marok . of similarity, 
there enters, on the contrary, an entire system of character-
istics--a well-known physiosnomy--by means of which the new 
fact becomes suddenly well-assured~ Indeed, the idea can offer 
more than we are readily able t o perceive, for it is possible 
to widen and enrich the new fact by characteristics which, for 
the first time, we are under occasion to seek, and which,toc, 
are often discovered. It is this rapidity with which knowl edg e 
is broadened,which gives a theory a quantitative excellence be-
{ a) 
yond simple observation". It is here that we find the sou ~ce 
of preferenc• for a theory, and the peculiar value attaching to 
it. 
But there is danger also. Two groups of facts, simply anal-
ogous, are expressed as identical. "Besides the e l ements in-
dispensable to the exhibition of the fact out of which an hy-
pothesis is created, the hypothesis vary frequently possesses 
others which are not requisite to the presentation. For the 
hypothesis is formed according to an analogy whose points of 
similarity and difference are incompletely known, otherwise 
there would be n o thing more to investigate. For example, the 
doctrine of light speaks of waves, while periodicity alone is 
necessary to an under-standing of the facts. These accessory and 
dispensable elements,are those embodied during the course of 
a. P.V. 267f. 
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transfo~ation. They ar~ gradually eliminated and replaced by 
(a) 
necessary elements". "Now, if, as quit• easily hap pens,suf-
ficient care is not taken", that is, if too much trust is 
placed in the hypothesis, "the most fruitful theories become a 
(b) 
positive hindrance to investigation". History furnishes a 
l arge number of such cases. 
If, howev~r, we ar~ able to k e ep ourselves free from such 
mistak es, there comas gradually to completion what Mach n ames 
the "teils •.•• sich selbst befestigende, verschaerfende, t e lls 
(c) 
sich selbst zerstoerende" function of the hypothesis. That 
is, ther• remains over from the various hypotheses only that 
wherein they a l l agree. This is the •ssential--the conceptual 
expression of facts freed from every bit of imagery. Everything 
exc e eding this is in danger of coming into contradiction with 
new facts. This purely conceptual expr~seion,Mach names a "di-
( d) 
rect description" • Such a descri p tion is a r equisite for the 
conceivability of facts. It is the result of analytical exam-
ination. "We can confirm the same as cer t ain even if we find no 
(e) 
k ind of analogy therefor". Movement is constantly towar ds the 
replacement of indirect desc r i p tion by direct. "If the g eomet-
rician wishes to grasp the fo~ of a curve, he analyzes it, in 
the first p l ace, into small recti l ineal elements. He knows, how-
ever, that these are mere l y a temporary, arbitrary means for 
the seizure, part by part, of that which cannot be seize~ all 
at once. When the law of the curve is found~he think s no long er 
a. Eo llo J o 24lf. 
b. P.V. 269. 
o. Eo llo J o 223!. 
d. P.V. 2 6 7. 
e. E.u.J. 244-5. 
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of the elements. Thus, it would not become natural science to 
s~e i n its self-cr~ated, changeable, economical means •.• real-
iti~s behind phenomena. With the growth o! intellectual know•-
edg~ concerning its material,natural science forsakes its mosaic 
play with pebbles, and seeks to ~sc~rtain the limits and form 
of the channel in which flows the living str~am of phenomena. 
The most sparing, simplest conceptual ~xpress i on of facta it 
(a) 
recognises as its goal". 
Almost inevitably there remains behind, in the conceptual, 
a certain coloring from the original figurative. This presents 
littl~ danger so long as we bear in mind that our theories rest 
on analogy. We may guard against considering the figurative as 
real, and appreciate the high value of analogy. At the same tim~ 
we do not lose sight of the nece s sity of progressively elimin-
ating the·metaphorical. 
Thus,w.e perceive that Mach considers the primitive goal 
of me c hanical physics as purposelesa,and incapable of attain-
ment. The sole value of theoreti•al formulations is their econ-
omical fitness, and this alone cernes 1~ •onside~a~~~n.The 
exposition brings to the fore the principle of Economy, and 
sharply emphasises its significance. Nevertheless, the presup-
position througho~~ is that the , hypotheses must agree, in their 
consequences, with the facts, and this is something which the 
Principle of Economy cannct decide. The norrual epistemological 
a. P.V. 235-6. 
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crit~ria remain detennining. The expos r t 
ciple of economy,a certain limiting and prescribing significance, 
in respect to the ideal of knowledg~ forruerly ~ntertained by the 
mechanical point of view. This is sufficient to make it worthy 
of recognition. 
Concerning the doctrine of 'direct' and 'indirect' dQ&crip-
remark 
tion, &" speoia.J:,·/1 . proper at this time. -.: , , ~he doctrine 
furnishes no information that facts are the merely sensuously 
presented, and these alone, it must be borne in mind, determine 
the content of a 'direct' descri ~ tion. Even for the founding of 
an aaalogy,diraot description is ne cessary. We move altogether 
in the sphere of the c unceptual. Facts are prepared and ceptifiad 
affairs. The only thing insisted on 1is that our descriptions, 
to be exact--that is, direct-- must not go b~yond the factually 
guaPanteed. 
This is important, for a second course of thought, which .. 
surrounds the whole with a very distinct atmosphere, 1s near at 
hand. In regard tc al l the physical concepts, the element of 
necessu~y is considered merely an a ddition of thought. It does 
not belong to the facts in any degree.The motives for its ad-
dition are various. The historical, psychoLogical,and economic, 
ca.Ll .for special attention. Necessity is an unproved 'pl.us '_,and 
must be removed from our simplest concepts. The manner in which 
Mach accomplishes thisjconstitutes his Critique of the Physical 
Concepts. This Critique we sha;ll ,.now: consider. 
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In his Critique of the Concepts Peculiar to Physics, Mach 
attempts to do two things. First, he wishes to establish that 
which is fundamental to the concepts; Second, he seeks to show 
that every attempt to pass beyond the principles here present~ 
can and d oes lead to nothing but error and confusion. 
We begin with the Law of the Cons ervation of Energy. It ss 
impossible to cr•ate work out of nothing, and the most manifold 
changes in physical conditions are brought to pass by means of 
mechanical work. Where conditions p a r mit complete reversal, the 
amount of work expended is capable o f recovery. Such eqlliYa.l-
enca is the entire meaning of the p ossible transformations of 
energy. To posit someth i:Mg incapable of destruct !.on-somethi ng 
substantial and self-equal-- represents nothing mere than a 
need of thought, a striving for stability of conception. It is 
s u 
not neces .::;ary to the facts. If/conside-red, it leads astra y. 
As with this law, so with t h e various other c c nca pts. Spaee, 
Tim~,and Motion may be discussed. These are assured through ex-
pe r i&nce, and contain merely relative moments. We express uni-
foromity of moti0n in terms of other · motions. Unifo r mijry is 
(a) 
merely relative. With the eliminat i on of absolute motion,there 
\ 
disap pears absolute spac~. In experienc_e, only relative posi tiona 
are given. Dynamic differences are denied,and no absolute stop-
p i ng- place is possible. To posit an absolute space,is to g o 
(b) 
beyond experience. It is the same with time. We cannot ab-
( c) 
solutely me asure the changes of things Consequent l y an ab-
a. M. 243-4. 
b. M •• 243. 




solute timQ, independent of every change, cannot be measured, 
Such an idea has no scientific value. It is a thing of thought. 
It is a concept with wh ich we cannot operate, for we pass be-
yond axperience,and no assertion can be made regarding the trans-
( a) 
empirical. 
The concepts o! Mass and Inertia a~ won from experience. 
Of the mass concept he says: "In such a concept there lies no 
theory. The quantity of mass is unnecessary. It possesses merely 
(b) 
th~ sharp fixation of a fact". "Over and beyond the recog-
nition of this fact, we cannot go without breeding confusion 
(a) 
and error". The law of inertia only says that therQ are accel-
eratione which deter>mine bodies to each other under certain 
(d) 
circumstances. If these conditions fail, the acce l erations 
fail to appear. While extended application is possible, all 
(e) 
accelerations are relative. 
What is the epistemological si~nificance of these discussions? 
This is the only question whic h conceJms us. And first, we ask: 
How much is here proved--established beyond a fact? 
The first thing is self-evident,namely, that certain phys-
ical concepts receive a large and determining part of their con-
tent from experience. The definition of such a concept is also 
self-evident, namely, that which "possesses a sum of experie nces 
(f) 
concentrated in itself". 
Also "all physical concepts are a bbreviated methods, which 
frequentLy hold within themselves ether methods, ordered in 
.-c:~==----~~- ----======== 
a. M. 243- 4. 
b. M. 232. 
c. M. 236. 
d. M. 268. •• M. 247. f. E.u.J. 112 • 
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- -- (a) 
economical manner for the use of 'ready prepared' experiences". --
It is further shown that actual attempts to secure for certain 
physi•al concepts a significance beyond that warranted by the 
actual facts, miscarry. 
Against this proof however, it may be said first, that it 
work s in unison with the demand that we attach ourselves, after 
hasty attempts, once again to the figurativ~ concept; that we 
.Lift ourselves in the sma.1.lest po s sible measur-e above the sure 
basis given by means <; f it. Such prudenc~ is quite harmless, 
and may easily become a methodical demand. It exhibits itself ~ 
a matter" of fact, in a noteworthy way,in modern physics, which 
aims to secure itself most expediently against the uncertainties 
of the metaphysics which touch its borders. It separates in 
sharpest manner that which comes into c onsider-ation as purely 
physical, from a.Ll that lies beyond. Mach emphasises this demand. 
His face is decidedly towards experience. Our concepts, as far 
as possible, must assume and retain empirical form. They ar-e to 
repr-esent experiences in the most economic manner. This is their-
only ser-vice. "If we wish to remain t r·ue tc t h e method which 
has led the greatest investigators of nature to their choicest 
results, we limit our physics to the expression of the actual, 
without building up behind this certain hypotheses in a regiGn 
where nothing is capable of being seized and proved. We have 
given as the actual, simply a ~onnection of mass movements, 
changes of t emperature, chemical changes, without think i ng for 
de.r the~e _eleme.nts _ an~th~ng_ else than certain phys-
a.. P. V. 232-3. 
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ical marks or> character-istics, given mediate"ly or> immediately 
(a) 
by observation". 
So much f o r> what is proved. We readily agree with what so 
far has been said. There is nothing new here. We have an emph-
asia on the word experience, that is all. But there is another 
tendency present in the expositiobs. Mach's critique aims at 
showing, that in no possible way, can we conclude anything from 
experiences, or form a corresponding physical concept, except 
through the immediately, sensuously exp erienced. This inter-
pretation falls into line with t h e bruad character>istics of 
his thought. His posit i on is that of a Sensualist. Sensuous 
phenomena are the real, and it is for these alone that scientif~ 
concepts are present. Their funct i on is one of orientation. 
Beyond this their affirmations cannot pass. 
Such assertions, however, are dogmatic. To r e cognise dif-
ficulti•s and actual miscarriages is not to present impossibi-
lities. Maturer experience may carry to a successful issue, 
attempts which hitherto have failed. Historical failures con-
sti t ~ ~te no final argument as to the legitimacy of a cer>tain pr•e-
cedure. 
It is worthy of notice that in those very experiences to 
which Mach appeals, and which he considers final, there is a 
strong impulse to the formation of concepts which pass beyond 
them. We see t h is if we c onsider his definition of Mass. It 
is merely something given according to facts. It is something 
a. M. 541. 
• 
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which expresses itself only in relation to othe~ b odies. But 
it is significant that these other bodies can change, and y~t 
the behavior of the body under examination remain constant so 
that the same affi~ations regarding it are possible. The ques-
tion naturally arises as to whether the individual mass is pe:-
culiar to the body examined, or to the othe~ bodies with which 
it is compared. This q~estion, it is to be noted, is in the 
spher~ of substance, and according to Mach, to attempt an answer 
can l~ad to nothing but error and confusion. Is an answer with~ ... 
h~ld? By no m~ans. While · it may be more difficult than at first 
sight appears, the answer is begun and inevitably stated in 
favor of the body examined. As with Mass, so with Space and 
Time. In spite cf t h e various bodies which we may employ for 
the purpose of anal ogy, we may speak of similar temporal and 
spatial behavior. The behavior, then, is something independent 
of the particular bodies themselves. 
If we wer~ to examine the other physical concepts, we would 
find eve~ywhere the same impulse to pass beyond the present and 
given. A compelling force · drives us forward. This Mach ignores, 
not because of any proof offered, but Ln the interests of his 
point of view. Yet it is clear that Mach finds it impossible to 
remain within the compass of this point of view. He, too, is 
urged forward. Within his conception of a reciprocal connection 
of phenomena, only in a greater or less degree possessing 
hope 
stability and constancy, the/- asserts itself that in spite of 
• 
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will -make it possibl~e~t~o~========= 
set up an ideal of knowledge self-confirmed, and capable o~ re -
solving or satisfying a need which had forced thought out be-
yond the prescriptions laid upon it by previous ways of think-
in g. 
The situation has entirely changed. Mach's discussion does 
not end as it began. The views here presented aro necessary but 
in quite another 1fay than Mach would have. Their necessity lies 
not in the fact that they result from the critique here offered, 
but that they are necessary to the critique,if its results are 
to be definite and satisfying. The best we can say for Mach's 
discussion so far, is that it 111a y prove an aid to further ar-
gumentation en behalf of his position. But so far as definite 
and full proof is concerned, the discussion has no decisive 
value. 
-4-
The Concept of Causality has been the storm c~nter of the 
classic battles of philosophy. Mach's critique brings it once 
more to the front. Through it he strikes at science itself, at 
least as it is generally conc~ived. Helmholtz' idea of cause 
and its importance for scientific research, furnishes Mach with 
a point of departure. According to Helmholtz, "t~e final goal 
of physical science is the discovery of the ultimate, unchange-
( a) 
able causes of natural occurrences". Mach declares this goal 
to b~ unattain~ble and unreal. His reasons for so declaring may 




b~ bri~fly stated. 
a). Helmlol tz' def1n1~1(Jn et cause, presuppfaea t.ha t the .. , 
same causes precede the same r~sults,and vice vePsa. Mach states 
this to be an impossibility. In t h e first place, such an assertion 
is merely an abstraction, secured by overlooking certain phases 
of the actual facts and occurrences. In reality we never find 
lil{e cases repeated. "If we speak of cause and effect,we bring 
into prominence 1n an arbitrary ma rmer just tilose moments which 
we must regard as at t hat time most suitable or necessary for 
our purpose. In nature there is no cause and no effect. Nature 
is prese!l t but once. Repeti tiona of similar ·cases, in which A 
is always connected with B, in which like results follow under 
lik:e conditions, ••• . exist only i n abstraction. This again has 
(a) 
its source in the purpose which it serves--the copying of facts". 
Now we readily see that if t his objection has ri ght on 
its side, there can be in nature no causal law, in fact no law 
at all, for every law aims at the expression of constant union. 
Al l this howeve ~ belongs to a later part of the discussion. 
b). From the preceding,it fo l lows that a~l our talk con-
cerning cause and effect as actual , arises out of inexact and 
incomplete observation. A more exact analysis would exhibit the 
so-aal led cause as merely the complement of a c omplex of facts, 
which determines the so-called effect. The complement varies 
as different elements of the complex are taken into consideration. 
To use a classic example: A body is warmed through t he rays of 






th~ sun. The one fQllows upon the uther. We say~ that they are 
related as cause and effect. But what does closer analysis reveal? 
Certain influencing conditions and factors whi ch musb be taken 
into consideration, if we are to give a just and full account 
o:f the mattera. The sun turns out to be not the comp l ete cause• 
(a) 
but only a complement. 
c). The so- called causal relation thus turns out to be a 
very complex affai .r. Instead · of a single, we havfi a manifold. 
The isolation of any one of the many relations present, is an 
abstraction. In a majority of cases a certain reversibility is 
possible. Every causal relation is in the final analysis, found 
tc be a system of simultaneous actions and reactions. 
d). The reversibility o:f the relation nullifies the idea 
o:f succession. Every e~ement becomes a function of the other. 
Cause is a misnumer. "I:f we, exactly and one by one, consider 
physical occurrences, it a ppears that we are ~b le to regard evevy 
immediate dependence as reciprocal and simultaneous. Just the 
opposite holds good o:f the common concepts, cause and effect. 
E\ren in entirely unanalyzed cases they find application,in man-
(b) 
ifold ways, to an indirect dependence". Mach profusely illus-
trates the conception here entertained. 
Thus with Mach., the causal gives way to the functional. "In 
the more highly developed physical sciences the use of the con-
cepts, cause and effect, is less frquent and more circumscribed. 
There is good reason for this, in the fact t hat these concepts 
a. A.d.E. 75-8. 





characterise any state of af f airs in only the most elementary 
and incomplete fashion. They lack keenness •.•• The exhibition 
of the dependence of the elements upon each other by means of 
the concept of ~notion; is much more complete and precise. 
Not only does this hold good when more than two elements under 
c onsideration, stand, not in indirect but in direct dependenc&, 
but much rather when they stw d in the midst of a vast chain of 
elements. Physics, with its &quations, makes this relation 
(a) 
clearer than can words". Causal relations are the incomplete l y, 
functional relations the compl~tely analyzed. Instead of saying 
that the fact B follows upon and out of the fact A, we must 
speak simply of the possibility of calculating the one fro m the 
other. Out of the functional relation and the metrical character-
istic of the one fact, there follows the characteristic of the 
others, and vice versa. Thus functional relations are simultan-
eous and reciprocal, and expr&ss nothing more than the dependence 
"of the conceptual 'Bestimmungselemente' of a fact simply in 
purely logical form, in just the same way as does the Irlathemat-
(b) 
ician". 
The 'Funkticnsbegriff' finds a large place in modern phys-
ics. Eve!"j ph~rsical ~qllatio" ~nani:fests 1 t. And in the experienoea 
which these equations deec!"ibe, ~e are to find the basis of the 
various concepts. All this we are willing to grant. And we are 
wiL l ing to recognise too, that in the presentations of natural 
sci~nc~, there is a tendency to minimise the concepts c~ Foroc 
a.. 




Thins, and Causality, at l9aet in their pJ.11mitive form. Mach 
ill ustrates al l these matters ~ rofusely, and for the present, 
we concede their force • 
Bu t what fol l ows? What signi f icance do these concessions 
have as re l ating to our prese n t question? How is the e p istemo .. -
l og i cal aff~cted? 
In the first place, we call attention t o t h e fact that t hese 
v a rious concepts cannot vrell be avoided. And it is s omewhat 
si gnificant that Mach himself ma kes use of them f or "Hand und Haus-
( a) 
Gebrau ch". Moreover these concepts have a sphere of interest 
other than the purely physical. They belong to the field of 
philosophy as well. It would seem then, tha~ we have here a gain, 
a mat te r of emphasis--a desire to discriminate clearly between 
two fie l ds of activity, that they may not infring e u p on each 
othe ·~s rights. The physicist . stands guard over his discoveries 
and acquisitions. He seeks to prepare hi lliself a gainst surprise. 
He strives, so far as in him lies, to make his Laws, etc., in-
dependent cf the wider usage and sig nificance philosophically 
attaching t o them. The natural scientist sets for himse l f a 
certain horizon, and vrhat he. perceives within it he p e rceives i n 
a c e rtain way--a way which assures him economy and e f ficiency 
of treatment • 
Surely this is nothing new,and nothing to create alarm. 
Have not all the great physicists of modern time be a n controlled 
by the same desire? Fechner, for example, says that Force is 
a. A. d. E. 258. 
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for the physicist ,- nothing more tlui n an a 
pression. Kirchhoff, to cite another, makes the task of M!ichan-
ics to be the representation of the movements of bodies by means 
of the simplest and most unambiguous description. The word 
Force no longer stands for a metaphysical cause of motion, but 
is solely a name fer certain algebraic expressions employes. 
So far we have no objection to offer. We are in the field 
of scientific laborJbaholding the working out of certain pur-
poses,by ways a nd means considered bast.The aim is definite and 
the field is circumscribed. The question for us, is whether 
Mach keeps within his proper domain. There is something speci-
fic to his endeavors which is not integral to the position of 
modern science, We hear him saying for instance, that the ~ 
v arious concepts here discussed do n o t disappear partially but 
absolutely. They are ali ke i mpos sible and superfluous. The 
scientific 'Weltbild' is without them, completely self-enclosed. 
The functional equations are sufficient for all things. They 
pass into all territory. Through t hem,all consummations are 
possibl e~ 
But it is quite evident that the functional equat i ons ar e 
not adequate to the task imposed. The 'Funktionsbegriff 1 is 
purely subjective. As such it represents an incomplete method 
of consideration. It is self- evident that there corresponds to 
the union expressed in a functional equatlon, a real dependence 
in nature. Now if the various concepts, Force, Substance, Caus-
• 
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a.li ty, etc.; are capablil of being formed -out of such filnc iona~ ==== 
equations, it is also evid~nt that the necessity of an objective 
dependence holds good for th~se also. Thus, $Ven if the special 
historical forms of these concepts should be shovm to be unten-
able, as Mach believes he has shown, the real a f fair is not 
touched. We are dealing here, with the results of special en-
deavors. Are these endeavors themselves justified? The question 
cannot ba so dogmatically settled as Mach would have us believe, 
for upon consideration we ~erceive that these concepts are capa-
ble of many and large t~ansformations. They have a history, and 
a development in history. As yet that development is not closed 
and complete. But imperfect formulat i on and interpretation can 
never, as we have said before, constitute an argument inimical 
to the existence and necessity of the particular affair con-
cerned. 
Bearing in mind what has just been said, we are ablil to 
appreciate the objection, _such as was o f' fered in connection 
with the concept of Substance, that in nature, there is no real 
constancy corresponding to that found in the concept. Such an 
objection cannot be final.~he fault may lie in the means at 
our dispcsal 1~~d not in the concept itself. These means are 
able to reveal only functional dependence, instead of spatial 
and temporal unity and permanence. The "impossible and super-
fluous" nature of the concept, _is, so far as Mach's argument is 







elusion. And this becomes more ~vident when we reflect, that 
in that permanency of reactions, of which Mach himself speaks, 
there lies a reference to a something which endures, and in the 
fixed connections and reciprocal relations of a group cf equa-
tiona, a reference to a real moment uniting the various relations 
expressed by them. Further epist~mological analysis may lead us 
to think of this real in a way widely diffe r ent from the pres-
ent. That do~s not allow us to neglect or eliminate it. To do 
so is simply to l~ave unconsidered, a question whose consider-
aticn the facts themselves demand. 
This 1s true also of the concept of Causality. The very 
facts force reference to it. For exampl~, by means of the proper 
~quation, a certain amount of work is connected with a certain 
amount of heat, in a pur~ly functional way. There is something 
which be l ongs cf necessity to the discussion that the equation 
does not express, n~nely, the fact that while rubbing produces 
heat, heat does not produce rubbing. R~versibility, which is an 
element in Mach's presupposi t .iian, is not here possible. But 
even if such reversibility were shown to be actual, this would 
not exclude causal relations from the members of such procesaes, 
even if they are not immediately related. Mach himself makes 
mention of the fact, that if two physical bodies belong together, 
while the change in one can correspond t G the chang e in the 
{a) 
other, this is not necessarily the case. It would appear that 
we have an element which lies beyond the domain. of the 'fu nctional'· 
------ ~=-==~== 
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Th~ functional does not th~n, ~xhaust all the possible relations. 
Mach ass~rts that this does no& constitute a metaphysical prob-
( a.) 
lem. Even if that were true,a ~lace is found f0r the concept 
which he so ~adily eliminates. This Mach p e rsistently refuses 
to recognise, at least in any satisfactory manner. Everything 
is dealt with 'economically' and 'psychologically', and that a 
a dogmatic and arbitrary spirit. Mach's equations do not cover 
all the facts nor do they pr6vide for all exigencies. We con-
tinually eome upon situations where they fail to meet the demanoo 
l.aid upon them. 
r 
Do(is reference to the unj,v&rsal connection offer any reli-ef'? 
We have heard that all conditions are mutually dependent. Every-
where we find the relative. The concepts presuppose the equations, 
and th~ equations the concepts. What does this seem to signify? 
We a ppear to be dealing throughout with the provisory, instrument-
al, and limited. By means of equations and concepts,w~ lay hold 
of some few elements out of the universal context. But it has 
become increasingly clear,that certain stopping-p l aces are found 
in the universal flow, a certain stability and constancy assured. 
Mach employs these unwittingly, but this makes their necessity 
the more ap parent. In a word, as we found in our discussion of 
the 'Elementenlehre', the supposed resolution of certain dif-
ficulties,gives rise to ethers more numerous and more insoluble. 
Mach's discussion so far has been SUGgestive. Within prescribed 
limits no objection can be rai s ed. Beyond this it becomes dog-
a. A.d.E. 275. 
• 
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matic and vacillating, using supports -wher~ necessary, removing 
them where eonvenient. To conced~ Mach's ~xposition special con-
tent and significance,forces it to recognise facts, at once 
contradictory and destructive. Without op posing it by a con-
structive point of view, we perceive that it has not well laid 
its fo un dations. This becomes more apparent as we consider Mach's 
'Naturbegriff'. 
-5-
Mach completes his polemic a gainst the Idea of C ausa~ity 
by a denial of 'Naturnotwendigkeit'. Here his subjective int~r­
pretation of the categories is seen at its clearest~a~d ~ the 
c onsequent inconsistencies become most evident. 
The following quotations express Mach's general position. 
"If I find that a physical fact behaves itself so as to a g r e e 
with my calculation or my construction, it is impossible to ac-
cept the contrary at the same time. I must, thus, ~xpect the 
phy sical resu~t with the same certainty with which I regard the 
consequence of the calculation or c unstruction as corr~ct. It is 
self-evident however, that this logical necessity must be dis-
tinguished from the necessity of the presuppositlon of the par-
all ~lism between the physical fact and t h e calcul ation, for the 
latter, constantly and progressively, rests on a customary sen-
suous experienc~. On the practic~ of firmly uniting the i d ea of 
the facts with that of their unive r sal behavicr~~ests the strong 
~xpectaticn of a known result,w~ich appears to the investigator 
• 
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cf nature,as a necessity. Thus there arises and expresses itself 
(a) 
what we ordinarily characterize as a feeling for Causality". 
Again, be says: "The physical complex of f'acts is simple,or 
allows itself to be so simply formed by means of experiment, 
that the iiD.IIlediate connections become visible. Now if, · by suf-
ficient commerce with this territory, we have woven for oursel~ 
c Gncepts Of the nature of these connections considered as uni-
v~rsa~ly corresponding to t h e facts, we must expect every single 
fact wh ich presents itself to correspond with these concepts. 
In t h is, however, there lise no necessity of nature. That is 
(b) 
'kausala' Verstaendnis". Finally, Mach expresses himself in 
the fo.Llowing direct and pain ted manner: "The.r-e is only logival 
necessity: if tc the fact A there belong certain qual ities, I 
cannot at the same time avoid them. But that they belong td 
it is simply a fact of experience. A physical necessity does 
(c) 
not exist". 
In the li ght of these quotations>ther-e can be no doubt as 
to Mach's position. There is no n•hessity ~ other- than the l 0gical, 
. (d) 
and the logical is merely psychological. A few further quo-
tations may define more clearly the significance of this position. 
a). "To explain.,means to lead compl ex facts back to the 
fewest and simplest possible. These simrlest facts are, in them-
sel ves, always unintelligible, that is, incapable of further 
anal ysis ••• . (!)ur · choice of obscurities is merely a question of 
taste . . · ' · We generally deceive ourselves with the fancythat 
a. W'L. 457. 
b. A.d.E. 72. 
W' L. 437. 
d. Cf. P.V. 227-8: M. 524. 
• 
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we conduct the unint~~~igibls back to the inte~ligible. But to 
understand consists in aaalysis, this and nothing more. We con-
duct unfamiliar obscuriti~s back to familiar obscurities. In the 
end we always come to propositions of the form, if A is, B is, 
thus propositions which must follow from the intuition and which, 
(a) 
thus, are in no further measure, intelligible". Thus an ex-
planation, an understanding, is merely a leading back to the known, 
an analysis int0 the simple. That is explained which is fruni~iar. 
And "science does not cr~ate one fact out of anothe~, it simply 
(b) 
arranges the known". The history of science furnishes abundant 
(c) 
illustration. "The correctness of a new rula can be made clear 
by the fact that this rule is often used, compared with expe~isnce, 
and tested under the most widely separated conditions. In the 
course of ti~e this process completes itself. The discov~rer 
wishes, however, to arrive at his goal mor~ quickly. H~ compares 
the result of his rule with all his familiar ~xperiences, with 
all the older rules, which have been many times proved, and in-
quiriis as to whether it sncounte~s any difficulty ••. It is quite 
in order,that , on the occasion of a new discovery, all means arii 
employed which can serve for the testing of a new rule. If the 
rule in the course of time has been pDoved with sufficient fr e -
q'.lency, it becomes science to recognise that any other proof 
is entirely unnecessary, that there is no meaning in considering 
a rule as more fully assured simply because it rests on anothe~ 
which has b e en won by the same way of observation, that one 
a. E. d. A. 31-2. 
b. P.V. 259, 240. 
c. M. 16, 12, 77, 75. 
• 
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thoughtful observation is as eood as ancther. As a matter> of 
fact,this desire for proof leads, in science, to a false and 
perverse auster>ity. A few propositions are considered more cer-
tain, and are regarded as t he necessary and unassailable prin-
ciples . of others, while possessing no extra certainty, and 0 .. ~ 
(a) 
quite frequently .a less degree of certainty". In summing up 
his observations Mach asks the quest :Lon : "How can the impression 
arise that an explanation accomplishes more than a description? 
If I show that a certain occurrence A behaves in a way similar 
to another more deeply trusted, B, then A becomes still more 
dependable ; if I show that it is composed of the series or the 
combination of the facts B, c, D, alread:, known. With this,hcw-
ever, one actual i~ replaced by another, one description by 
others better known. The affai~, thus, becomes more familiar to 
me. It simplifies itself, but no other change occurs. If we ask 
'When is a fact clear?', we must answar 'When we can copy the 
same by means of very simpla and fa..'lliliar intellectual oper-
( b) 
ations'"· 
b). "If all the facts were directly accessible to us, 
just as we desired knowledge of tham, no science would ever 
arise. Because the memory cf the individual is limited, the aa- --
teria.l must be arr>anged. This is brought about by an 'Ablei+--
tungsr>egel'. This has no more actual value than the individual 
facts together. Its worth lias in its convenience. It is an 'econ-
(c) (d) 
omical' ". There are many passages of a similar na t11ra. They 
----
a. Mo 80-2. 
b. W' L. 437. 
c. E.d.A. 31. 
d. P.v. 282-3; VI' L. 121. 
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al l point to the sam~ conception of our so-called laws and con-
cepts. Everywhere the re comes to the front the psychological 
method of consideration. The language of Hume is frequently em-
ploy~d. There is the 'foaling' of necessity, 'custom', 'expe~ 
tations'. Our so-call~d ~xplanations guard us against 'surprise' · . • 
Clearn~ss lies in familiarity, and th~ process leading to such 
result is one of 'imaging'--'copying'. The legal is reduo~d to 
the symbolic and economic. How much does Mach mean by this 
psychological ~mphasis? Are his assertions satisfi~d if the sub-
jective is given the val ue of a 'neben'; or does the exposition 
demand a more ~xclusiv~ interpretation? And if so, what proof 
is offer~d for such position? Or again, what does such an em-
bracing conception of the psychological involv~, and what _ r~active 
effect has it on the system in whcih it occurs? 
Mach's 'lcgische Notwen~igkeit', in respect to nature, may 
mean any one of three things. 
a). In nature there is nothing adequate to our concept of 
necessity. In this sense nature can never supply us with any-
thing b~yond an 'as if'. 
b). The assertion of s uch nece s sity may !'fist on the fact 
that the r~sults won through induction are largely vitiated by 
~rror. "Th~ agr&~ment of the conc~pts among themselves is a 
logically necessary demand, and this logical necessity is the 
on~y one we know. The beli~f in a neo~ssity of nature~arises 
only wh~r~ our concepts of nature are s~fficiently adapted to 
-90-
hold inference and fact in agreement. The assumption of a suf-
ficing adaptation of our concepts can be refuted a~ any moment 
(a) 
by .xperience". 
c). Mach's conception may mean also that occurr~nces in 
nature, when considered with exactness and completeness, are 
'g~setzlos und regellos' and possess a contrary appearance only 
in certain measure--a measure, however, suf~icient for practical 
purposes. 
Which of these possible interpretations best accords with 
Mach's entire exposition? The foregoing discussions have pointed 
strongly in one direction. We shall see here that the indications 
wer~ not misleading. 
The first two possible interpretations leave the episterna...,. 
logical and metaphysical quite untouched. They neither exclude _ ;~ 
nor replace so far as evaluating principles are conc e rned. We 
can all agree that there is a subjective side to scientific ' r~-
search,_and remain easy in our minds so i'ar as hostile irnpl1""' · 
cations are concerned. That experience of necessity in nature 
is not full and complete, that -regularity is all we at present 
really know by way of empirical science, is not to be disputed. 
I~ Mach says only this, he says nothing which affects the cri~ 
teria of knowledge. But if he does so limit his meaning, other 
statements must be regarded as errors or lapses in syllogistic 
reasoning. The quotations given above make this su~ficiently 





It is the mere radical interpretati on then, which demands' 
our a t tention. The demand is r oLnforced by Mach's Crdti que of 
th~ physical concepts,and his a~tack on t he i~en cf causal ity • 
In the former case,we were under necessity of ascribing to Mach 
the point of view that it is impossible to conclude to anything 
not sensuously mediated. We found, however, that this position 
was the expression of a dogmatic attitude. Thus Mach's elimin-
ation of CQnceptual validity must not be considered author i "t!' --
tative and final. In the latter case,we were forced to a like c · . 
conclusion concerning the funct i onal. The more radical view 
projects itsel f as representative of the entire exposition,but does 
not a ccount for the facts,nor full~ compass the implications of 
Mach's own assertions. We de not eliminate the causal idea when 
we conceive of , furJCtional r elations. , ~.Tlie ~. l:egal: - ve :J..ati crhs · ~ •x~ - . · 
p_ressed .b.y the f :_mctional equa t ions ,presuppose real , nec essary 
connections. 
What then 1is the situation? On the one hand, we perceive 
certain interests, definite and assertive; on the other hand, 
we confront !acts which threaten those interests-- mak~ the de-
sired goal diff i cul t to attain. The dissolution of the concepts, 
force and substance,is the consummation longed for, but this 
is made impossible by the fact of necessity involved in any nor-
mal and rational interpretation of Mach's 'Funktionsbegrif!'. 
The goal must be abandoned,or some interpretation of necessity 
wi.th 
must be offered which makes it compatible/the dissolution des i red. 
... lQl-
And thus 'Naturnotwendigkeit' is deni~d. The rad cal - interpre-
tat ion given above is nocessi tated by the context. -:.can 1 t stand 
examination before the bar of reason and experience? 
It 1a worth remarking,that there is in nature the appear-
ance of necessity and law. Nature seems to proceed in regular 
fashion. Even if we believe it impossible to get behind this 
regularity as other than an 'as if', ther>e ar>e features and fun:c-
tions involved which force the matter> upon our> attention. We 
may find it easier to give sc1me account of the matter>1 .than to 
withhold a verdict. What does Mach himself have to say? ·T he ·' 
~ollowing · ;quotations may be considered representative. 
"our physical science consists in the conceptual quantitative 
(a) 
expression of facts". "But every proposition of physical 
science is an abstraction which has for its presupposition the 
{b) 
repetitiQn of similar cases". "If we copy the facts in thoughts, 
we never copy them absolutely,but only that phase of them which 
(c) 
we consider weighty; our> copies are always abstractions". 
"The progressive refining of the laws of nature, the increasing 
limitation of expectat i on, corresponds to a more complete ad-
aptation of thoughts to facts. A complete adaptation to every 
individual thought is naturally impossible. The manifold and 
largely univ~rsal application of na~ural laws to concrete, actual 
cases,is possible only by abstraction, by the s1mpl1r1cat1on, 
ec"lematiaing, 1dea.l1s1ng of :t'aots, through i!'Jtellect,.lal analysis 
of the same into such simple elements that, out of these, the 
a. M. 547. 
b. Mo 549. 





•.•• Natural sci~nce can be defined as a k ind of 'Instrumenten-
sammlung' for the intellectual completing of whatever facts in-
completely present themsalv~s, or for the lar~est possible 
lirni tation of cur expectations in all cases which the future 
(a) 
may offer". 
The idealising moment in our natural laws is here ~mphas­
ized. Our laws are won by abstraction. Our idea. ot legality is 
found by idealisation of the actual. We note, however, that thms 
idea, with its larg e fictitious element, presupposes the rep-
etition of .iike results under like condi tiona. But because- it 
is an abstraction, even this presupposed regularity does not 
exist in nature but only in the abstraction, in the idealisatio~. 
Thus Mach explains the regularity of nature by eliminating it. 
Even the regular is not objective. The only necessity is a 
psychological nece s sity, a necessity found in the dependence of 
our ideas upon each other. "It is only our schematic image which 
produces like cases. It is only in it that there exists dependence 
(b) 
of certain marks upon each other". "The facts are not required 
to adjust themselves according to our thoughts. Our tbcughts, 
our expectations, merely arrange themselves according to other 
thoughts, namely, 'according to the concepts termed of the facts • 
If we assume that a fact corresponds exactly to our simple, 
ideal concepts, our expect~tion in agreament with t h is will also 
be exactly determined. A proposition of physical science has 
-----~-
a o E o l.lo J • 44 7 o 
b. P. V. 228. 
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always only hypothetical meaning •••• Absolute exactness, that 
exact and clear determination of the results of a presupposition 
for 
in every particular complete, exists :.; physical science not in 
(a) 
sensuous reality$but only in theory". 
This conclusion ,we repeat, involves Mach in the most s e r- . 
ious difficulties. The ~cllowing words ahsolute~y contradict 
the statements oited above. "As a r.uatter of fact the proposal 
to investigate a certain field requires the assumption that it 
is of such a nature as to lend itself to investigation. This, 
in turn, presupposes permanence, for not otherwise could any-
( b) 
thing come by investigation. "That dependence is a fast and 
firm afSair, we presuppose if we enter upon investigation.Pre-
vious experience has given this presupposition the right of 
pre-emption , and every fresh result of investigation strengthens 
(c) 
us in the same" . "Only that can be described, copied conceptual-
( d) 
ly in thought, which is uniform, under law". "We have made no 
blunder in our postulate of t he uniforruity of nature if, on 
account of the inexhaustibility of experience, its absolute ap-
plication does not permit of proof and if, like every aid to 
(.) 
science, it remains largely ideal". "That we, by the help of 
a law, can prophesy proves the deep uniformity of our environ-
( .f) 
ment". "I am convinced that, in nature, only that happens 
(g) 
which can happer1, and that this can happen in only one way". 
"The more exact quantitative research aims at the greatest meas-
( h) 
ure of eaa.ctitude". "During investigation,every investigator 
a. E.u.J. 447-8. e. E.u..J. 450-1. 
b. E.u.J. 277. :f. P.V. 250. 
c. E.u..J. 28. S• W'L. 393. 
d. M. 6. h. E.u.J. 446. 
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io necessarily a determinist. This is the case even wh~n he has 
to do with mere probabilities. The propositions which express 
the computation of probability hold good only when chances ara 
( l'l) 
discovered to be regularities". 
The assumption c'f necessaroy roelat! ons in na.t'.!roe could 
scarcely be more definitely expressed than 
cua t ations. If it be said that these represent mere accidental 
lapses, we reply that thair frequency and emphatic character 
make it scarcely possible for us to bow them ou t so courteously. 
They hold too integral a place to be passed by as casual slips. 
Rather do they signify a dialectic which demands attention. 
Moreover i~ we should minimise these inconsistencies in 
the largest possible degree, Mach's system does not regain its 
stability thereby. The keystone to the arch is lack i ng • No 
proof is offered that 'Naturnotwendigkait' does not exist. And 
so long as nature gives evidence of regularity and constancy, it 
is legitimate to demand such prcof, for we ·. are :. not .. 'Unger ·neces'-
everythiwg which can be doubted. Rather is 
it our privilege to doubt nothing except for sufficient reasons. 
We accept things on their own report ; till contrary judgment is 
forced upcn us. This is quite necessary and thoroughly scientific. 
Again, it is a mere chimers to fancy that denial of an 
objective order leaves any epistemological standing-place, let 
alone furnishes such by reason of its demands. Such a denial 
involves intellectual annihilation. The assumption of a rational 
a. E.u.J. 277- 8. 
• 
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order is bound up with the very structure of knowledge. And by 
rat i onal we mean just what Mach so dogmatically deni~s, namely, 
an order moving under the control of fixed laws, an order com-
posed of real connections, a decidedly objective cosmos, however 
ideal may be our conceptiuns and whatever the ultimate explanation. 
This leads us to say,that Mach's conception of the relation 
of the idealising moment to necessity,is false to fact. It is 
wrong to say that idealisation first introduces necessity. 
It is the facts which motive the idealising act. An analysis of 
scientific procedure tends to confirm this statement. Every 
examination of nature,strengthens our faith in the report which 
nature makes of her own structure. And ones more we call attention 
to the fact that Mach seems to recognise th~ true relation of 
the facts to the idaalising moment. He says: "It is experience 
which must first teach what dependence cf phenomena upon each 
(a) 
other exists, and this experience alone can teach". Again he 
asserts: "Our concepts are, as a matter of fact, self-made, 
yet they are for that very reason not made in ' a manner entirely 
(b) 
arbitrary". 
Thus Mach seems under continual necessity of transcending 
his position. He denies necessity in nature,only to restore it 
in the most unmistakeable manner. And with such restoratio~ 
every specific point of view taken in the earlier part of the 
discussion loses its force and lays aside its nature. Law is n c 
longer a mere synopsis; economic experience once more takes on 
a. M. 293. 
b. M. 280. 
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==========- - - ---the form of real investigation; sensation is dethroned; the 
theoretical is again given real content and function; causality 
receives anew proper place and worth; Mach's whole course of 
thought is given a new and strange a ppearance. One t l1 ing we 
cannot avoid in analysing Mach's 'Methodenlehre'. No matter how 
we may approach it, whether on the higher level or on the lower, 
we bring it into conflict with itself. The problems concerned 
receive nG satisfactory solution. The philosophical remains as 
it was before. No new necessity has been laid upon it by exact 
research and scientific method. Mach's philosophic results must 




I n the prac 0ding pages , comparatively little has been said, 
s p ecifical.ly and directly, concernine the 1 lar>P:' "'ro':'ds 1 < . . ? 
M~0 ~ 1 R way of thinking. However, the gener'al discussion has 
made it pretty clwar that the principles and corwep tions peculia> 
to his tr~atment, must move within a well-defined and limited 
area, and that whatever value belongs to them,must be second-
ary and relative. 
As a matter of fact, very much is settled, once and for all, 
when we are made to see the nature and condi tic;:1s of th e;ught as 
a faculty concerned in the apprehension of truth •. We have a 
tribunal before which to cite all doubtftil and suspici o1.lS char-
acters. The main thing cal led for,is pre;per and sufficient io-
sich t. The task is no longe r' one of g eneral settlesant but 
rat~er one of the wor k i ng cut cf detail~ The principles of the 
s ystem are establish ed beyond the possibility of removal; there 
remains the critical consideration cf candidates f o r tl1e system; 
' · 
and the r:. roper placi ng cf elern ents whic h ha~l e secured admission . 
It is inte resting , in this cc rmectic.,n, to take note oi' the fc.l-
.Lowing weeds c:' a disclllle of t h e New Realism; 11 The peall ty we 
know and the reality we predicate , with any inte~ligibility 
c r si g nificance, is reality fop ,ls a s pcedicatoes. Even when we 
think of this kind of reality as b einG poss i ble in another 
universe unradiated by a single g.learu of intellig ence OI' sense 
expa rience, we still are thinkins c f it, ·.yc cannc,t t~link our-
.- 1 08 -
selves and ~verythinc out of s uch a universe with~ut belug in 
the univ erse to d0 t l1 e thinking away. No thinker- n o objec t 
(a) 
t hought". Knowladge and the Ob j ective order are , thus , ccn-
str~J. ed in terms of a fundcl.l::J.ental ccndi ticn wh ic}: <:t.dr:: i ts of en-
lar-ged a cq:.mintanc e , b .... !t v,rh i ch defies reduct i C!J to the pass i ve , 
in strumen t al and utilitar ian. 
Sci ence, at once, tak·3 S on a far' n0u l0r> form tl: c.n t::&t w11ie~ 
LlRch aslc pibes to it. It i s a free ac tivity. I t cr•3ates its .:.., vrn 
g oa l, and, at every t u rn, ~isrlays the ~nique chap~cte~ and 
s ubl irj e self- mast ·:: ry of t h e li Ie cf eeascn . "No one at ten::;::ts 
to brin~ a science tc p~ss, withcut laying an ideal fcundat i cn . 
Or1ly i 'r•cr;1 a sin[;le , supreme an d inner purpose, wh ich, first of 
a.ll, m:otl·_d s t he whol.e a possibility, can that CY>id inate, which 
(b) 
we call scienc~". "In the system is the whole earlier than 
the part •••••• The idea is architectonic; it creates t he sci ence~ 
He who builds a house , first makes for himself the idea of the 
whole". Science is not the answar to biological. necess ities ; 
it is a s~lf-set task. It is not the spor t of circumstance, 
but the progressive unfolding of an absolut9 value. It is not 
adaptation but realisation, not description, but, in a very 
raal sens~, creat ion and transfor-mation. It exhibits, not t he 
blind groping of an instinc t , lar_sely uncertain as tc its own 
wan ts and desires ,, but the free ; s lad leading cf a~ ideal 
toward a goal wh ich it is Given to t h e eye of faith to see. 
" Sc ientific faith s urvive s all errors, all i nadequate theories, 
a . Fullerton ; Introductic~ tc P~ilcsophy. 
b. Kant; Crit iq_ue · a·f P :.l::-"8 1teanon. 
and tr iumphs in the face cf ccntradic ticns '.vhich seem eve~"­
( a ) 
'!-.rhelr.c:.ing and final " . I f scie nce begins with a CJ.Uest i c. n it 
e nds with a t heory . The theory is the c h i ef thin3 . Once estab-
lis h ed it is mere certain t han ccn-
':'f !:lich are questi c u ed. 
Vle have seen t ha t t h is c ~ . ncept i Gn of kncwJ.eds e and s~ i e ~-Jc e 
is nc·t absent from Mach ' s s y stem of thou[~llt . Certain statemen ts 
give express re6ogniticn of it, ~~d l1~t t~a entire po i n t of 
· vievv tc a h i gher level. Bu t, even whe r e it is not e xpressed, it 
is p r>esurp osed , for it is this ccncepticn vrhich enabl es r.~ac h tc 
ca2r•y l'1 is vmy of tllinkin;; to an a ppare n tly success f ul. issue. 
His ar5w~entation is g r c unded en p r inciples which he affec ts to 
desr-dse,and whic::1 he de s ires to el i minate. When o n c e vre come 
to see t hi s - to papce iv e how u tterly ir~1r:c :..:; s i ble it is tc z:; et 
away frcm t he de eper conc ep tion of thought as an active and con-
sti tutive p r incip l e- we u nde r stand h ow sec ondary and relative 
the psychc l oeical and evplutionary must b ecome. At t h e very 
best , we l1ave descriptions cf sett l ed facts within a s y stem, and 
net e:x.planat ion of the way i n Vihich that system itself carr.e to 
be ; we have a possible enric!m1ent of knowledg e re c a rding pha ses 
and forma of hi stori c al development, but no final word s aicih cc n-
cevn i ng c ons titution and validity . I t i s within t h is s phe re 
that we are t o look fer t~e legitimate meani n3 acd real value 
of Iv!a.Gll 1 B peculiar cc;ncept ions. The princ i ples of adaptati on , 
•• K:~~exJ; Tn• D1-r-ect ·and ."Fundamen1:-al P roo:ta oi the Chris tian Rel igion. p.34. v 
economy and continuity will serve c:.s i J. lustraticns. We give 
the8 b rief considerati o n. 
a ) . "The a daptati Gn of thoughts co f a c t s , we 0~~~~"~a ~ ~ =~ As 
cbsarv~ti0n(al~e adaptation of thoughts to e ach oPher, however, 
as theory". "Experience g rows by means of progressive adapt-
ation of thcuBhts to f~cts. By means of t h e adaptation cf 
t~au~~ts tc each other Jthere arises the clearly o r dered, sirup li ~ 
fi ed and consistent s ysteo of thought, which hovers before us 
( b) 
as t h e ideal cf scienc~ "· "The impulse to the completion 
of half-ub served facts in thoue;hts arises, as we indeed feel, 
not in the individual facts; nor does it lie, as we just as 
well know, in our will; it appears rather as a strange power, 
as a law standing over a gainst us, which drives beth thorights 
( c) 
a.nd facts forward". 
These quotations place before us afresh the meaning and 
scope of the principle of adap t ation as conceived by Mach. We 
also perceive, at once, something of the difficulty accompany-
ing s ~ ch a biological conception of this idea. Adaptation is 
deternined for us,and not at all by us. The process of adaptat-
ion mcves forward without c u r help and in spite of our will. 
We are under· compulsion tc a law foreign to ourselves. We ar>e 
dr>iven for>ward fr>om behind. We ar~ in deed and ib trut~ a piece 
of nature. But this c cntradicts a~l we have said above concern 
ing the nature of thought and sci~uue. The two are entirely in-
CCI!!I'Htible. 
a. E.u.J. 162. 
b. E. u. J. 18. 
c. p . v. 249 . 
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Never~heless , Mach speaks cf the 'Ideal' cf science. It is 
difficult to see how, under> the concepticn we have j ust r:.en t -
ion~::d , an ideal can have any r6~1 :pilia<:.. e or meaning. An ideal. 
is something freely posited, not sonething fated to arrive in 
ordained season. And this ideal, with Mach, is adaptatio~ ttsel~ 
the a.daptation of thoughts to facts. But . then, Mach vacates 
his former position. Adaptation cannot r emain a law of nature. 
But , pRPhaps : we are t o d3 fine ada~tation in t~rns of 
t:--· ~J th. Then, again, one of' two things comes to pass. We have 
in the fact cf adaptation, a criterion for the correctness of 
a theory or of a thought,and so hav~ introduced a 'worth est-
imate', which rr;eans transcendence of t~1e psychological point 
of view,and the presup position of a deeper princi ple of inter-
pretation upon which the rsycholo;::;ical itself rests. Or 1He are 
simply giving a name to t hat wh ich we find peesent. 'llhat ;,which. 
we · find to be at present existing, we characterise as· ~ade.pted.: :: 
If it w&re not adapted it would not exist. It is easy to see 
that we have here r'3ally said nothing. The whole matter of 
tru th is stilJ left to be d~fined, or we must accept every ex-
isting fact as the truth, \Vhich , of course we wo u ld , by no 
means, be wi~ling to do. We are reminded, here, of the doctrine 
of the survival of the fittest. T:l:.is was thought to do great 
service as a principle of explanation. And ye t when the ambig-
uity was removed,and it was seen at its true value, what did 
it mean ? Simply this, that the able tc surviva s'.lrvive,and the 
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unable to survive do not survive. No one doubts the truth of 
this, but f0r purposes of explanation, we might very well feel 
that we l:ave not made much progress. Before WG get anywhere, we 
must define fitness and unfitness as related tc survival . 
Otherwise vre are only uttering commonplaces,no matter how much 
we may think WfiJ are talking wisdom. Is it not just t h e same 
here? Leaving aside the mechanical implications of Mach 's use 
of the idea cf adaptat ion, the whole affair reduces itself to 
this: Either Mach must transcend his own position and make the 
idea an entirely subuPdinate one,or. ,·-he ·· simply utters platitudes~ 
iimd ~ leaves the whole question of truth untouched, as he fails 
t u ~~ka ~ agy ~ real distinctions within the merely existing. We 
have, it would seem, a show of wisdom lacking the power. And 
yet phrasings; , especially when giving for th a certain kind 
of sound, can g ive the app earance cf lliUCh deep thought ~n 
matters philosophical. AdaptatiGn may be useful to describe an 
order of events, but put forward as a principl e of explanation, 
it either beats time,or leads to its GWn annihilation. 
b). The same general argument holds geed :foe, '.:. :. 10 r rlnaiple 
of economy. In the best cf cases it is a biological hypothesis. 
As such, it is secondar~r, and subj GC t to logical and epi s temc_ ·· 
l oe;ical examination. When vre once call to rhind the meaninG of 
method , we perceive something of the measure of truth present 
in the conception. The very name lDe thod suggests cconom:j!cal 
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nrocedure. But in terms cf 'what are Wt; tc define the econorn-
. ' -
ical? And is econcn1y the only principle which govePns achieve-
me nt ? Al l experience answers i n the negative. The ae s thetical 
and artistic are certainly not gcv8rned b y this principle a -
lone. Thera is a hci.Gely saying t-.; tr1~ effect that "the lcng-
est way round is the shortest ,,.,ay home". It would s eem to have 
a larg e measure of application wherever there is present a 
d ist i nctly ideal goal. A proper conception cf the tas k of sciene~ 
makes it only one cf several cousiderations. Convenie nce, here, 
is not the only or the chi(:lf concern. The man who investigates 
nat~r~ aims to understand the facts. His goal is a victory cf 
thought ever ruatter. The welfare of the human race ruay ccnstr•ain 
him. How larg ely would mere ccnveniencd then fi gure? And even 
if we limit scientific endeavor to the acquisiticn of knew-
ledc~ ~or its own s ake, a knowledse of facts as facts)would 
not put a quietus on achievement. For facts can never rsplaca 
laws .:: .. nd the search for laws woul d stiLL gc on . The 11eed cf 
k nowledge is net limited to the bielogical . 
This conception finds a counte r part in Spencer's concept-
ion of ~overaent along the line of least resistance. Here, a@.ain, 
what seems so full of promise , turns out.,_cn examination,to be 
an abs t ract and barr• en affair,. ffi f'. :: elae :. ,imp;li;es , .~ VIha;t. r.carries i:t 
~nti"r~ely :beyonQ: -itself. What looked so simple., becomes enorru-
ously complicat ed; wha t a ppeared so ui timate, is forced to tc-Jce 
1 ts p.lac& among he s_ubordinates and ralat lves. The pri~ciple 
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of economy is larg ely in the same place. It may be said to be 
a description after the fact. As such it is mad e to include 
all the motives and ideals which led up to the goal attained. 
But to so use the name e con omical is to complet e ly transcend 
its original meaning. It is made to fit t h e facts and n c longfrr 
denotes that which meets t h e demand of t he biclogi cal. In any 
c ase ,its value remains purely and solely descriptive . As a 
mean s of evalua tion it quits i t s p roper s pher~, and says and 
c). "Evoluti on and t he inviolability of nat~ral law are 
supposed to be proved, but the scient ifi c man knows that so 
far f rom being prcved,they are merely the popular express ion 
of the presupposition cf scientific p r oof , t ha l aw cf contin-
uity, with its co n s equenc es. For with the principle of cont in-
uity assumed, development in some fcrm is the necessary out-
c ome •••••• The la.w of continuity is' fundamental to the mode en 
view of t he world. Thu s t h e universe takes en the aspect, not 
(a) 
of a manufactured article, bu t cf a growing organism". 
Thi s law of continuity is fundam~ntal to Mach' s entire 
treatment. I t ruay be sai d to be the shaping force in his system. 
Its interests and s upp os ed demands a re evec>ywhere paramount. 
a n d the measure of its coerc ion? 
As erapl cy :;; d by M:ac;h ~ the l aw s eems to rula ot.~t the possi ,- · 
b1 11 ty of a leap. Al l prc.gress is _ by way of succes sive n1odifi~··· 
a. Knox : The DiJ."~ct and Fundamental Pr c c.. f's of the Chri stian 
Rel i8iun; Scribner's, 1908. p p 16- 17. 
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Cations. We pass from point to point without a break. True, dis-
continuity is expressed as a fact in certain statements, but 
these, once more, we may regard as written on the level of the 
free activity of t hought, and contradicting the f ·_;_ndamental mo-:-
tive and point of view. Is M~ch's conception, we ask, integral 
to the law? And does this .1..aw possess the coercive force which 
Mach cunceives it to have? 
We might b e more di f fi dent in the matter cf questioning 
here, were there any ccnse ns u. s cf cpin1c,n among the scientists 
the~selves as to what the law under consideration requires. 
As a matter of fact we find a l l vari e ties ~~c shades of opinion. 
"As used by some speculators, it seems to exclude all antitheses 
whatever; and Spencer's a t tempt tc deduce all heterogen~ity 
from the homogeneous,may be viewed as an attempt to give the 
law this universal significance ••..•. The empi~icist has no dif-
ficulty in showing that sensation is the only fact, be~us e to 
allow anything different would be to break continuity. But 
while cue speculator deduces life from the lifeless by the 
pri nciple of continuity, another denies the possibility on the 
same ground ••.• Materialism is affirmed and denied in the name 
of continuity •••• Sometirues it is simply a denial of creation 
and tha supernatural; sometimes it means that nature never 
makes a leap; som~times it means that all phenomena are but 
phases of a common process, and that from any fact what~ver in 
the syst~m we can pass to any ether, however' diff'~rent, by 
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s1rupla cod ificat ions of this process. In short, it m~ans any-
( a) 
thing Which hap p 811S to be des ir-able" • 
We Sli8m, thus, to be conf·ron t~d. with a rational demand, 
but with very unclliar and urJsteady notions as to just what thjs 
demand signifi•s. May Wlil ba allowed tc intQrpr>et it in t he 
light of what was said abov@ ccnclirning thli life of reason as 
fr•~ and purposive activity. 
The law of contin uity , from this point of vi~w, cannot 
exclud& personal initiativ~. It erects no bar>ri~r . of neclissity 
against anyone. It cannot be interpr>eted in ter>ms of mechanical 
necessity. The ant$cedent cannot be tracQd into the consequent 
on the imp e r>scnal plana. Na tur•al cau.sali ty becomes i nsuffic 1 ent. 
Self- deter>minations cannot be so explained. Even cur> sensations, 
cannot be dedu6ad f~om an antecedent state of mind. In a word, 
the whole affair i s carpied up, of n ece ssity , into the sphere. 
of purpose. Here, for t h e ftrst time,do es it become clear> and 
answer to the demands made by t he !.'acts concer>ned. Only in the 
light of the vcl:i tional and purposive can vve under-stand rn'J..ch 
cf the c ontent cf the material world. P e rsonal impress mod-
ifi es arJd transforms. A new antecedent is introduce ci and con-
sequents ar>isG for whi ch the natur>al. aystem is net sufficient 
and is net respc.nsible, but which, at onco, take t h ei r p1.ace 
within that system and submit t h emselves to the common order 
J 
of law. And it is just i n t a rms of this corrunon order that the 
law o:f continui t~ must _9 e int e!"pr~ t ~d . Cont inuity can ~·~an no 
a. Bowne; ~11etaphys ics ; pp. 263-4. 
more than the contin !.:ti ty of r-h~nu11enal law. And this contin :.:ti ty 
it is , which in sur~s our purposiv ~ activities recogniti o n , and 
provides a plac~ for their pr~per interpr~tation and constant 
funct:Lonine. 
Thus, continuity is not the fearsowe thins that it was sup-
posed to be. It is not a metaphysicaL doctrine nec~ 3 sitatinc a 
fundamentaL revolution 1 but rathe~r an inductive postulate by 
means of which we construe experience. ·It advantageth much for• 
certain purposes , but it is neith er productive nor prescriptive. 
It imposes no barrier to free purposive activity, but rather 
offers conditions which make the exercise of freedom most thcr-
ouchly effec ti V9. I t determines us tc; the ace eptanc e cf no ne'>'l 
epistemological cr metaphysical principles, but rather des-
cribes t!H;l manner' in which tlw-...:tght as a living power expresses 
and realises itse l f in a phen~menal order. As sucl1 it is worthy 
of a~L acceptance ; as frequently conceived it demands chasten-
ing and exorcism. 
Having once r•id ourselves of the psychological and evol-
utionary obsession, we may with profit consider the value of the 
genetic mode of treatment. And this value is n e t far to seek , 
nor can it be de~~e6iated or despised . The psychological point 
of viev1 emphasises the life of thought as something concretill 
and actual. This has been too frequently overlooked in the in-
teres~$ of the p~rely logical. Fa~lur~give full credit to 
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the psychology of knowledge has been a primitive cause of failure 
to many otherwise notable schemes of epistemology. Thought has 
b e en reduced, in the interests of logic, to a merely formal 
affair. An 'intellectual barbarism' has frequently held the field. 
Matter-of-fact thinki~g has been disregarded. All that makes 
thought a real and concrete has been held in contempt as a sort 
of by-product scarcely worthy of consideration. 
This the psychological treatment aims to rectify. If we 
are to know thought, we must study it as a full-orbed and vital 
' 
activity. Knowledge is more than the result of logical arrange-
ment. It comes "through the reeling- full Gommerce of an intel-
ligent, self-conscious will which finds itself in relations 
of action and reaction with other purposeful wills. This is the 
fact of experience, although we can only partially explain the 
fact. This is the truth with regard to the development of ex-
perience, although we can never who l ly clear up the mystery of 
such a development ••• Without intellect there is no knowledge; . 
without feeling there is no knowledge; without doingJand exper-
iencing the effects upon ourselves and our object, of this do-
( a) 
ing, there is no knowledge". A narrower conception is bound to 
call forth protest. Such protest we have in the psychological 
emphasis. As such we bid it welcome and stand ready to aid it 
in the furtherance of its purpose. 
-- -
------ -----------------
a. Ladd; Knowledge, Life and ~eality: Dodd, Mead Co. N.Y. 1909. 
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